{"id":24401,"date":"2022-09-27T08:26:03","date_gmt":"2022-09-27T08:26:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/?p=24401"},"modified":"2022-09-27T08:26:03","modified_gmt":"2022-09-27T08:26:03","slug":"deshtimi-i-sistemit-financiar-boteror","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/2022\/09\/27\/deshtimi-i-sistemit-financiar-boteror\/","title":{"rendered":"D\u00ebshtimi i sistemit financiar bot\u00ebror"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Teprimeve t\u00eb financiarizimit po i del boja. Abuzimi i borxhit, publik dhe privat, i redukton investimet e frutshme, favorizon pak t\u00eb pasurit, inkurajon spekulimet, dob\u00ebson shoq\u00ebrit\u00eb. Taksa e turpshme e inflacionit.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb 20 vitet e fundit roli i finances n\u00eb funksionimin e ekonomis\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb zgjeruar n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb dramatike. P\u00ebr ta kuptuar, duhet nisur nga nj\u00eb e dh\u00ebn\u00eb shum\u00eb thjesht\u00eb, por dometh\u00ebn\u00ebse. N\u00eb k\u00ebto dy dekada koeficenti i rritjes s\u00eb kreditit ka qen\u00eb mesatarisht dy her\u00eb m\u00eb i lart\u00eb se ai i ekonomis\u00eb reale, nd\u00ebrsa n\u00eb periudha historike normale t\u00eb dy vlerat ecnin p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsisht me hap t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00eb. Kjo u ka mund\u00ebsuar qeverive t\u00eb marrin hua para vazhdimisht p\u00ebr t\u00eb financuar deficitin aktual. Por financiarizimi nuk ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb vet\u00ebm me borxhin publik, por edhe me t\u00ebr\u00ebsin\u00eb e aktor\u00ebve ekonomik\u00eb: familje dhe biznese. Debitimi \u00ebsht\u00eb kudo. P\u00ebrpara se t\u00eb p\u00ebrshkuajm\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsin\u00eb e fenomenit, le t\u00eb k\u00ebrkojm\u00eb t\u2019i kuptojm\u00eb zanafill\u00ebn. Tendenca ndaj borxhit sistematik i p\u00ebrket n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb pakontestueshme fundit t\u00eb Bretton Woods. I krijuar n\u00ebn egjid\u00ebn e Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara n\u00eb 1944, ky sistem konsistonte n\u00eb nj\u00eb disiplin\u00eb t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimit. N\u00eb raport me dollarin, valut\u00eb qendrore e sistemit, monedhat e tjera duhej t\u00eb ruanin nj\u00eb lidhje fikse dhe t\u00eb mos divergjonin mbi 1%. Vendet an\u00ebtare nuk mund t\u00eb zhvler\u00ebsonin k\u00ebshtu pa autorizimin paraprak t\u00eb Fondit Monetar Nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar dhe pa premtimin p\u00ebr t\u00eb aplikuar \u00abkusht\u00ebzime\u00bb t\u00eb caktuara t\u00eb negociuara me vet\u00eb Fondin. N\u00eb k\u00ebmbim t\u00eb avantazhit t\u00eb k\u00ebtij pozicioni qendror, dollari ishte subjekt i nj\u00eb detyrimi konvertueshm\u00ebrie n\u00eb ar n\u00eb rastin ku bankat qendrore t\u00eb huaja kishin d\u00ebshiruar t\u00eb shkarkonin kart\u00ebmonedhat e gjelb\u00ebra t\u00eb akumuluara.<\/p>\n<p>K\u00ebshtu, sistemi i Bretton Woods ishte shum\u00eb m\u00eb tep\u00ebr se nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje mbi fiksueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e k\u00ebmbimeve. Ishte nj\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u2019u respektuar nj\u00eb disiplin\u00eb ekonomike nga ana e shteteve an\u00ebtare. N\u00ebse nj\u00eb vend do t\u00eb donte t\u00eb kryente n\u00eb politik\u00eb m\u00eb shpenzuese se ato mesatarisht t\u00eb aplikuara nga t\u00eb tjer\u00ebt \u2013 dometh\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00ebse do t\u00eb donin t\u00eb rrisnin deficitin e bilancit apo t\u00eb bilancit t\u00eb pagesave \u2013 do t\u00eb viheshin menj\u00ebher\u00eb n\u00eb rregull. Fondi do t\u00eb lejonte nj\u00eb zhvler\u00ebsim formal vet\u00ebm n\u00eb pranin\u00eb e sigurimeve se shteti n\u00eb fjal\u00eb do t\u00eb futej n\u00eb \u00abshtegun e duhur\u00bb. Ky sistem ka funksionuar mjaft mir\u00eb deri nga fundi i viteve \u201860.<\/p>\n<p>Por me rritjen e shpenzimeve publike amerikane (shtet social, por sidomos lufta n\u00eb Vietnam), Uashingtoni \u00ebsht\u00eb ndodhur p\u00ebrball\u00eb nj\u00eb dileme: ta financonte konfliktin me taksat apo me borxhin. Ka zgjedhur opsionin e dyt\u00eb dhe debitimi i tij \u00ebsht\u00eb ngjitur n\u00eb qiell. Aq m\u00eb shpejt sa q\u00eb rezervat e tij t\u00eb arit nuk kan\u00eb qen\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb mjaftueshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar konvertimin dollar \u2013 ar. K\u00ebshtu m\u00eb 15 gusht 1971 presidenti Nixon ka vendosur n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebanshme fundin e kovertueshm\u00ebris\u00eb t\u00eb valut\u00ebs amerikane. Sistemi i koeficent\u00ebve t\u00eb k\u00ebmbimeve fikse ka r\u00ebn\u00eb dhe \u00ebsht\u00eb z\u00ebvend\u00ebsuar nga nj\u00eb fluktuim i p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsuar i monedhave. N\u00eb at\u00eb koh\u00eb ekonomist\u00eb t\u00eb shumt\u00eb jan\u00eb g\u00ebzuar nga dalja e volatilitetit t\u00eb koeficent\u00ebve t\u00eb k\u00ebmbimit. K\u00ebmisha e forc\u00ebs q\u00eb kufizonte lirin\u00eb e politikave ekonomike m\u00eb s\u00eb fundi kishte ceduar. Secili vend mund ta zgjidhte tashm\u00eb lirisht rrug\u00ebtimin optimal p\u00ebr rritjen.<\/p>\n<p>Por n\u00eb 1971 nuk ishte realizuar nj\u00eb gj\u00eb: e gjith\u00eb bota po futej n\u00eb nj\u00eb periudh\u00eb debitimi dhe shpejt superdebitimi, shum\u00eb e rrezikshme. Me lirin\u00eb e l\u00ebvizjes s\u00eb kapitalit dhe me shpikjen karakteristike t\u00eb jasht\u00ebzakonshme t\u00eb risive financiare, rekursi ndaj debitit \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb rregulli dhe \u00abefekti stimul\u00bb i sistemit ka tejkaluar \u00e7do limit imagjinate. N\u00eb koh\u00ebn e Bretton Woods, secili shtet ishte p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebs p\u00ebr monedh\u00ebn e tij dhe stabilitetin e vler\u00ebs s\u00eb jashtme t\u00eb tij. Me zhdukjen e sistemit, nuk kishte m\u00eb asnj\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrgjegjsh\u00ebm. Sot \u00ebsht\u00eb tregu ai q\u00eb vendos p\u00ebr vler\u00ebn e valutave. Fundi i Bretton Woods ka shqyer dyert ndaj debitimit nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar, duke e degdisur n\u00eb harres\u00eb nocionin e disiplin\u00eb dhe t\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunimit ekonomik.<\/p>\n<p>Debitimi global, sipas llogaritjeve t\u00eb Institutit t\u00eb Financ\u00ebs Nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare, ka arritur pike marramend\u00ebse. Sot shkon n\u00eb 300000 miliard dollar\u00eb, 360% e PBB bot\u00ebrore. Shifra asnj\u00ebher\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebrejtura n\u00eb koh\u00eb paqeje, q\u00eb p\u00ebrkthehen n\u00eb tejetdebitim t\u00eb aktor\u00ebve ekonomik\u00eb, qeveritar\u00eb dhe privat\u00eb. Kjo do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se sistemi yn\u00eb financiar \u00ebsht\u00eb tejet i ekspozuar (n\u00eb terma t\u00eb aft\u00ebsive t\u00eb rimbursimit). Pra vulnerab\u00ebl, pasi sa m\u00eb shum\u00eb nj\u00eb sistem \u00ebsht\u00eb i ekspozuar dhe sa m\u00eb shum\u00eb nj\u00eb ngadal\u00ebsim ekonomik (edhe modest) mund t\u00eb \u00e7oj\u00eb n\u00eb faliment dhe, n\u00eb kaskad\u00eb, krizash financiare. Cilat jan\u00eb rreziqet dhe sfidat e k\u00ebtij debitimi masiv? Le t\u00eb fiksojm\u00eb tre shqet\u00ebsime t\u00eb m\u00ebdha.<\/p>\n<p>I pari, nj\u00eb tejetekspozim i sistemit global rrit probabilitetet dhe r\u00ebndes\u00ebn e krizave financiare. Ky fenomen amplifikohet nga p\u00ebrqindjet e interesit t\u00eb mbajtura q\u00ebllimisht t\u00eb ul\u00ebta nga politika monetare akomodimi ekstrem t\u00eb dekadave t\u00eb fundit. Duhet kujtuar se koeficent\u00ebt e referimit t\u00eb fiksuara nga bankat qendrore kan\u00eb qen\u00eb negativ\u00eb (n\u00eb terma real\u00eb) p\u00ebr m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 20 vjet. Nj\u00eb dob\u00ebsi e till\u00eb jo vet\u00ebm ka favorizuar dob\u00ebsimin, por ka degraduar edhe cil\u00ebsin\u00eb e tij. Kur koeficent\u00ebt jan\u00eb shum\u00eb t\u00eb ul\u00ebt, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb nul apo negativ\u00eb, preokupimi i shum\u00eb meanxhuesve t\u00eb fondeve \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00eb krijojn\u00eb fitimin pavar\u00ebsisht nga rreziku. \u00cbsht\u00eb k\u00ebshtu q\u00eb huat\u00eb ndaj shoq\u00ebrive t\u00eb vler\u00ebsuara negativisht (si ato t\u00eb grad\u00ebs BBB) kan\u00eb p\u00ebrfunduar p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsuar m\u00eb shum\u00eb se gjysm\u00ebn e tregut. Agjencia McKinsey ka llogaritur se totali i bilanceve globale \u00ebsht\u00eb trefishuar n\u00eb 20 vjet (fakt i paprecedent) dhe shkon sot n\u00eb 1540 trilion dollar\u00eb, 18 her\u00eb PBB globale.<\/p>\n<p>I dyti, dob\u00ebsia e p\u00ebrqindjeve t\u00eb interesit dhe boll\u00ebku i kreditit shoq\u00ebrojn\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb r\u00ebnie t\u00eb investimit prodhues. Kjo v\u00ebrejtje nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e vet\u00ebdukshme. N\u00eb teori, mund t\u00eb pritet q\u00eb p\u00ebrqindjet e interesit t\u00eb favorizojn\u00eb projektet e investimit, por realiteti \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr: qysh kur jan\u00eb ulur, ka filluar t\u00eb konstatohet nj\u00eb r\u00ebnie e investimit prodhues bot\u00ebror. Stoku i kapitalit prodhues \u00ebsht\u00eb zvog\u00ebluar n\u00eb 20 vjet me 2.5% karshi PBB globale. K\u00ebtu duhet kujtuar obsesioni i Keynes p\u00ebr \u00abkurthin e likuditetit\u00bb. Ekonomisti anglez ishte sigurisht n\u00eb favor t\u00eb p\u00ebrqindjeve t\u00eb interesit t\u00eb ulta, boll q\u00eb t\u00eb mos ishin tejet t\u00eb ul\u00ebta. Efektivisht, kur kursimi nuk shp\u00ebrblehet m\u00eb, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb kur taksohet n\u00eb rast koeficent\u00ebsh negativ\u00eb, q\u00ebndrimi i investitor\u00ebve ndryshon: b\u00ebhet racional t\u2019i ruaj\u00eb fondet n\u00eb form\u00ebn m\u00eb likuide t\u00eb mundshme sesa t\u2019i investoj\u00eb n\u00eb projekte prodhuese t\u00eb rrezikshme. Rritja e an\u00ebs likuide t\u00eb kursimit financiar karakterizon situat\u00ebn aktuale n\u00eb Europ\u00eb dhe shpjegon misdashurin\u00eb ndarj investimeve prodhuese afatgjata. Nj\u00eb ekonomi nuk mund t\u00eb lul\u00ebzoj\u00eb kur ky z\u00eb dob\u00ebsohet.<\/p>\n<p>I treti, paradigma e sotme mb\u00ebshtetet mbi rritjen e vler\u00ebsimeve t\u00eb aktiv\u00ebve n\u00eb favor t\u00eb kategorive sociale t\u00eb privilegjuara. Prej 20 vjet\u00ebsh, rritja e \u00e7mimit t\u00eb aktiv\u00ebve (imobiliar\u00eb apo financiar\u00eb) p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson \u00be e rritjes s\u00eb bilanceve bot\u00ebrore. K\u00ebshtu, n\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara, ku tendenca \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb akute sesa mesatarja, 87% e rritjes s\u00eb bilanceve buron nga rritja e vler\u00ebsimeve dhe jo nga vlera e shtuar e krijuar nga investimi. Ky ndryshim i paradigm\u00ebs \u2013 rr\u00ebshqitje drejt rritjes s\u00eb vler\u00ebsimeve n\u00eb kurriz t\u00eb rritjes reale dhe t\u00eb rrogave \u2013 sjell t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn dy pasoja t\u00eb mrekullueshme. Paras\u00ebgihthash, sistemet q\u00eb favorizojn\u00eb 10% m\u00eb t\u00eb pasur, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb kush p\u00ebrfiton nga vler\u00ebsimet, n\u00eb d\u00ebm t\u00eb pjes\u00ebs tjet\u00ebr t\u00eb popullsis\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajn\u00eb n\u00eb vet\u00ebvete nj\u00eb brisht\u00ebsi sociale t\u00eb frikshme. Pastaj, sistemet q\u00eb penalizojn\u00eb investimet prodhuese nuk lejojn\u00eb t\u00eb financohen projektet e e pafund\u00ebm t\u00eb transformimit ekologjik t\u00eb domosdoshme p\u00ebr epok\u00ebn ton\u00eb. N\u00eb shkatht\u00ebsin\u00eb e p\u00ebrgjithshme monetare t\u00eb 15 viteve t\u00eb fundit kan\u00eb lul\u00ebzuar vler\u00ebsimet e aktiv\u00ebve financiar\u00eb, duke u mund\u00ebsuar bart\u00ebsve t\u00eb aksioneve t\u00eb realizojn\u00eb fitime shum\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb larta se shp\u00ebrblimet normale (operating returns). \u00cbsht\u00eb e qart\u00eb se me k\u00ebto kushte investitor\u00ebt kan\u00eb preferuar t\u00eb realizojn\u00eb fitime t\u00eb lehta m\u00eb shum\u00eb se t\u00eb financojn\u00eb projekte t\u00eb rrezikshme dhe jo shp\u00ebrblyes n\u00eb periudh\u00eb afatgjat\u00eb. Ky v\u00ebzhgim \u00ebsht\u00eb i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm. Nj\u00eb ekonomi nuk mund t\u00eb funksionoj\u00eb gjat\u00eb dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb mir\u00ebn e t\u00eb gjith\u00ebve n\u00ebse zgjedhjet e investitor\u00ebve (dhe faktikisht t\u00eb politikave monetare) jan\u00eb t\u00eb orientuara nga mund\u00ebsit\u00eb spekulative t\u00eb menj\u00ebhershme sesa drejt perspektivave t\u00eb rritjes reale.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb harkun e 20 viteve, debitimi e ka tejkaluar investimin. Gjithmon\u00eb McKinsey ka llogaritur se midis 2000 dhe 2022 duheshin impenjuar 4 dollar\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb krijuar 1 dollar investim neto. Edhe pse ka pabarazi t\u00eb forta midis nj\u00eb vendi dhe tjetrit, mbetet q\u00eb ky shum\u00ebfishues \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb rekord historik; nuk mund t\u00eb ngjall\u00eb preokupim p\u00ebr mb\u00ebshtetshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e ardhshme e kaq shum\u00eb borxhi. Megjith\u00ebse \u00ebsht\u00eb normale t\u00eb debitohesh p\u00ebr t\u00eb investuar, \u00ebsht\u00eb e rrezikshme t\u00eb shikosh impenjimet financiare t\u00eb fryhen p\u00ebrtej nevojave reale. \u00cbsht\u00eb shenj\u00eb e nj\u00eb tejekspozimi t\u00eb nj\u00eb borxhi q\u00eb sh\u00ebrben p\u00ebr t\u00eb financuar shpenzimet aktuale, deficitin e sektorit publik dhe spekulimin imobiliar. N\u00ebse v\u00ebrejm\u00eb raportin midis vler\u00ebs dhe prodhimit (vler\u00eb neto\/PBB), v\u00ebrejm\u00eb se p\u00ebrpara vitit 2000 e dh\u00ebna ishte p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsisht e q\u00ebndrueshme, me pike t\u00eb p\u00ebrkohshme t\u00eb detyruara thelb\u00ebsisht nga sektori imobiliar. Nga mij\u00ebvje\u00e7ari i ri, vlera neto dhe vlera e aktiv\u00ebve reale rriten sistematikisht m\u00eb shum\u00eb se PBB.<\/p>\n<p>K\u00ebshtu q\u00eb duhet kthyer n\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebrteta m\u00eb t\u00eb thjeshta dhe m\u00eb bazike. Reshtja s\u00eb marri hua dhe krijuar monedh\u00eb me tepri \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb zgjidhje p\u00ebr problemet strukturore. Duhet reformuar ku \u00ebsht\u00eb e nevojshme dhe qen\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebmendsh\u00ebm t\u00eb mos dob\u00ebsohet sistemi yn\u00eb financiar. Shp\u00ebrblimi i kursimit, n\u00eb ve\u00e7anti ai q\u00eb d\u00ebshiron t\u00eb investoj\u00eb n\u00eb periudh\u00eb afatgjat\u00eb, n\u00eb funksion t\u00eb kushteve t\u00eb ofert\u00ebs dhe t\u00eb k\u00ebrkes\u00ebs. T\u00eb mos lejohet t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetet nj\u00eb sistem ekonomik ku \u00be e aktivitetit p\u00ebrkthehen n\u00eb fitime t\u00eb destinuara p\u00ebr nj\u00eb pakic\u00eb t\u00eb vog\u00ebl. Ridh\u00ebnia pun\u00ebs roli i saj themelor i transformimit social dhe ekonomik, p\u00ebr t\u00eb shmangur stanjacionin e rrogave. Favorizimi i kapitalit njer\u00ebzor dhe i fondeve t\u00eb bizneseve, duke braktisur prioritetin tradicional t\u00eb dh\u00ebn\u00eb debitimit. Reflektimi se me \u00e7far\u00eb mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrmir\u00ebsohet me nj\u00eb reform\u00eb t\u00eb sistemit monetar nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar, p\u00ebr t\u2019u centurar mbi nj\u00eb disiplin\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe dhe mbi nj\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunim ekonomik t\u00eb v\u00ebrtet\u00eb. P\u00ebrfundimisht, dalin 3 imperativ\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>I pari, ridh\u00ebnia jet\u00eb investimit prodhues, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb ndalimi fiksimit n\u00eb zero i p\u00ebrqindjeve t\u00eb interesit afatgjat\u00eb, duke pranuar se \u00ebsht\u00eb tregu q\u00eb shp\u00ebrblen kursinin n\u00eb funksion t\u00eb k\u00ebrkes\u00ebs dhe ofert\u00ebs.<\/p>\n<p>I dyti, v\u00ebnia nj\u00eb limit ndaj \u00abrrezikut moral\u00bb. Nevojitet t\u00eb kuptohet se dob\u00ebsia e politik\u00ebs monetare ka \u00e7uar n\u00eb zhvillimin e jasht\u00ebzakonsh\u00ebm t\u00eb atij q\u00eb e quajm\u00eb \u00abrrezik moral\u00bb. Sa m\u00eb shum\u00eb nj\u00eb sistem debitohet, aq m\u00eb shum\u00eb dob\u00ebsohet, pasi t\u00eb pamaturit rrezikojn\u00eb t\u00eb mbesin n\u00eb faliment. P\u00ebr t\u00eb shp\u00ebtuar nga nj\u00eb rrezik i till\u00eb dhe nga ai i nj\u00eb r\u00ebnieje t\u00eb tregjeve, bankat qendrore kan\u00eb besuar se duhet t\u2019u japin aktor\u00ebve super t\u00eb debituar nj\u00eb garanci implicite t\u00eb destinuar q\u00eb t\u00eb kufizoj\u00eb humbjet n\u00eb rastin e nj\u00eb krize financiare. Nj\u00eb garanci e till\u00eb, q\u00eb nuk \u00e7on n\u00eb pages\u00ebn e asnj\u00eb premioje siguruese nga ana e p\u00ebrfituesve, ka luajtur nj\u00eb rol thelb\u00ebsor n\u00eb fenomenin e superdebitimit. N\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha efektet, i ka nxitur operator\u00ebt t\u00eb marrin gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb rreziqe pasi faktikisht ishte kolektiviteti q\u00eb i siguronte. Ky \u00abrrezik moral\u00bb \u2013 shokues n\u00eb planin etik pasi ia transferon kombit koston e rreziqeve t\u00eb marra nga pak njer\u00ebz \u2013 i ka inkurajuar n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb konsiderueshme shkeljet me financiarizimin.<\/p>\n<p>I treti, p\u00ebrcaktimi i sa m\u00eb shum\u00eb drejt\u00ebsie sociale, nga momenti q\u00eb financiarizimi ka luajtur n\u00eb favorin e 10% t\u00eb privilegjuara n\u00eb kurriz t\u00eb atyre me rrog\u00eb. Ruajtja e paradigm\u00ebs aktuale nuk do t\u2019u mund\u00ebsoj\u00eb kurr\u00eb vendeve tona to modernizohen apo t\u00eb ringrihen. K\u00ebshtu q\u00eb duhet ndryshuar, p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndaluar p\u00ebrparimin e \u00e7mendur t\u00eb krijimit t\u00eb monedh\u00ebs e debitimit dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb inkurajuar zhvillimin e fondeve m\u00eb shum\u00eb sesa debitit. Duhet pranuar se njer\u00ebzit m\u00eb t\u00eb favorizuar t\u00eb paguajn\u00eb pjes\u00ebn e tyre p\u00ebr nj\u00eb ekonomi m\u00eb t\u00eb drejt\u00eb dhe m\u00eb efikase.<\/p>\n<p>Do t\u00eb habiteshit ndoshta prej faktit q\u00eb nuk kam evokuar inflacionin. Pas nj\u00eb periudhe t\u00eb gjat\u00eb mungese, t\u00eb detyruar ndaj efekteve t\u00eb rrogave t\u00eb ul\u00ebta t\u00eb inkorporuara n\u00eb importet e vendeve emergjente, rritja e \u00e7mimeve \u00ebsht\u00eb kthyer brutalisht n\u00eb sken\u00ebn ekonomike bot\u00ebrore. Koeficenti i lart\u00eb aktual (8% e rritjes s\u00eb \u00e7mimeve mbi baz\u00eb vjetore) i detyrohet shkaqeve t\u00eb ndryshme: ngurt\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb zinxhir\u00ebve prodhues (n\u00eb vijim t\u00eb limiteve t\u00eb vendosura prej disa koh\u00ebsh n\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara globalizimit); intensitet e rigjall\u00ebrimit t\u00eb k\u00ebrkes\u00ebs pas muajsh mbylljeje sh\u00ebndet\u00ebsore; rritje e \u00e7mimit t\u00eb k\u00ebnd\u00ebve t\u00eb para; efekte t\u00eb luft\u00ebs n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb; rikthim i epidemis\u00eb n\u00eb Kin\u00eb. Por nuk duhet t\u00eb harrojm\u00eb se inflacioni, pavar\u00ebsisht shkaqeve, favorizohet gjithmon\u00eb nga krijimi i valut\u00ebs. Kur masa monetare rritet p\u00ebr nj\u00eb koh\u00eb t\u00eb gjat\u00eb m\u00eb shpejt se prodhimi \u2013 sakt\u00ebsisht fenomeni i p\u00ebrshkruar k\u00ebtu \u2013 p\u00ebrfundohet gjithmon\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb asistuar n\u00eb nj\u00eb rritje t\u00eb \u00e7mimeve. \u00cbsht\u00eb ajo q\u00eb e quajm\u00eb \u00abekuacion sasior i monedh\u00ebs\u00bb, e shpallur na ekonomisti francez Jean Bodin n\u00eb 1558 dhe asnj\u00ebher\u00eb e hedhur posht\u00eb deri m\u00eb tani p\u00ebr sakt\u00ebsin\u00eb e saj.<\/p>\n<p>Disa do t\u00eb jen\u00eb t\u00eb tentuar t\u00eb thon\u00eb se inflacioni ka t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn merit\u00ebn se e leht\u00ebson debitin q\u00eb peshon mbi huamarr\u00ebsit, por edhe nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr prej iluzioneve t\u00eb prodhuara nga idhtar\u00ebt e financiarizimit. Inflacioni nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb kurr\u00eb nj\u00eb zgjidhje: t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb pranim i tmerrsh\u00ebm i d\u00ebshtimi. \u00cbsht\u00eb n\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit nj\u00eb taks\u00eb q\u00eb varf\u00ebron mas\u00ebn e pafundme popullore duke ia reduktuar fuqin\u00eb bler\u00ebse. Nj\u00eb taks\u00eb e turpshme pasi nuk i n\u00ebnshtrohet parlamentit dhe pse e menduar p\u00ebr t\u00eb fshehur gabimet kujt e ka lejuar, deri p\u00ebrgatitur at\u00eb. Nuk uroj ask\u00ebnd t\u00eb niset n\u00eb rrug\u00ebn e stagflasionit, t\u00eb cilit ia kemi paguar \u00e7mimin n\u00eb k\u00ebto 20 vjet dhe q\u00eb p\u00ebrmbledh t\u00eb gjitha efektet negative q\u00eb kam p\u00ebrshkruar, nga varf\u00ebrimi tek paq\u00ebndrueshm\u00ebria.<\/p>\n<p>(<em>Jacques de Larosi\u00e8re de Champfeu \u00ebsht\u00eb an\u00ebtar i Institut de France, ish Drejtor i P\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm i FMN (1978 \u2013 1987), Guvernator i Bank\u00ebs s\u00eb Franc\u00ebs (1987 \u2013 1993), President i BERZH (1993 \u2013 1998). Aktualisht \u00ebsht\u00eb k\u00ebshilltar i presidenc\u00ebs s\u00eb grupit BNP Paribas. Ka qen\u00eb autor i raportit p\u00ebr Komisionin Europian mbi Rregullimin e Tregjeve si pasoj\u00eb e kriz\u00ebs financiare t\u00eb 2008 \u2013 2009<\/em>)<\/p>\n<p><strong>P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Teprimeve t\u00eb financiarizimit po i del boja. Abuzimi i borxhit, publik dhe privat, i redukton investimet e frutshme, favorizon pak t\u00eb pasurit, inkurajon spekulimet, dob\u00ebson shoq\u00ebrit\u00eb. Taksa e turpshme e inflacionit. N\u00eb 20 vitet e fundit roli i finances n\u00eb funksionimin e ekonomis\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb zgjeruar n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb dramatike. P\u00ebr ta kuptuar, duhet nisur nga nj\u00eb &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":24402,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[46],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-24401","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-ekonomi"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24401","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=24401"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24401\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/24402"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=24401"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=24401"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=24401"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}