{"id":32030,"date":"2022-12-17T18:23:11","date_gmt":"2022-12-17T18:23:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/?p=32030"},"modified":"2022-12-17T18:23:11","modified_gmt":"2022-12-17T18:23:11","slug":"lufta-pas-khersonit","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/2022\/12\/17\/lufta-pas-khersonit\/","title":{"rendered":"Lufta pas Khersonit"},"content":{"rendered":"

M\u00eb 9 n\u00ebntor 2022, pas sugjerimit t\u00eb gjeneralit Surovikin, ministri i Mbrojtjes rus Sergej \u0160ojgu ka urdh\u00ebruar t\u00ebrheqjen e ushtar\u00ebve rus\u00eb t\u00eb dislokuar n\u00eb bregun e djatht\u00eb t\u00eb lumit Dniep\u00ebr, p\u00ebrfshi qytetin e Khersonit dhe nj\u00eb seri vendbanimesh t\u00eb vogla fshatrash. I transmetuar n\u00eb direkte televizive n\u00eb Rossija 24<\/em> por ka shum\u00eb mund\u00ebsi ishte filmuar prej koh\u00ebsh, vendimi \u00ebsht\u00eb paraprir\u00eb nga evakuimi i rreth 120000 civil\u00ebve prorus\u00eb, q\u00eb n\u00eb rast rikthimi nga Ukraina do t\u00eb kishin qen\u00eb viktim\u00eb e k\u00ebsaj larje hesapesh tashm\u00eb e par\u00eb n\u00eb lokalitete t\u00eb ripushtuara nga Kievi, nga shkat\u00ebrrimi i urave t\u00eb shumta dhe nga heqja prej rrug\u00ebve t\u00eb Khersonit e flamujve rus\u00eb dhe e monumentit t\u00eb themeluesit t\u00eb qytetit Grigorij Pot\u00ebmkin, viktim\u00eb e parashikueshme e cancel culture<\/em> me shije borshti. N\u00eb harkun e dy dit\u00ebve, n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb rregullt, rreth 30000 ushtar\u00ebt rus\u00eb n\u00eb rajon jan\u00eb spostuar n\u00eb bregun e majt\u00eb t\u00eb lumit, ku tashm\u00eb prej koh\u00ebsh ishin n\u00eb p\u00ebrgatitje llogoret e reja dhe nd\u00ebrsa ushtar\u00ebt ukrainas afroheshin me maturi n\u00eb Kherson, midis entuiziazmit t\u00eb popullsis\u00eb proukrainase dhe persekutimet kund\u00ebr mbetjeve proruse, ushtria ruse ka hedhur n\u00eb er\u00eb ur\u00ebn Antonovskij, q\u00eb lidh Khersonin me bregun lindor t\u00eb lumit, duke p\u00ebrcaktuar k\u00ebsht\u00eb edhe simbolikisht fundin e t\u00ebrheqjes.<\/p>\n

Pse trupat ruse jan\u00eb t\u00ebrhequr nga Khersoni? Deri pak dit\u00eb m\u00eb par\u00eb, \u00e7do l\u00ebshim i bregut t\u00eb djatht\u00eb dukej se ishte jasht\u00eb diskutimit. P\u00ebrve\u00e7se n\u00eb planin historik dhe simbolik, duke qen\u00eb qyteti i par\u00eb i themeluar n\u00eb kuadrin e atij kolonizimi \u2013 t\u00eb d\u00ebshiruar nga caresha Katerina e II \u2013 e stepave t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs aktuale jugore q\u00eb ka \u00e7uar n\u00eb lindjen e Novorossija<\/em>, qyteti i Gannibal dhe Pot\u00ebmkin p\u00ebrb\u00ebn edhe nj\u00eb kok\u00eb ure t\u00eb \u00e7muar drejt Nikolaevit dhe Odes\u00ebs, pse jo edhe pik\u00ebn e nj\u00eb zone kushinet\u00eb n\u00eb mbrojtje t\u00eb bregut t\u00eb majt\u00eb t\u00eb Dnieprit dhe, p\u00ebr pasoj\u00eb, t\u00eb Krimes\u00eb. Midis marsit dhe majit t\u00eb k\u00ebtij viti, n\u00eb bregun e djatht\u00eb t\u00eb Boristenes, trupat ruse kan\u00eb pushtuar nj\u00eb territor t\u00eb gjat\u00eb deri n\u00eb 100 kilometra dhe t\u00eb gjer\u00eb 40 kilometra, dhe kund\u00ebrofensivat e p\u00ebrs\u00ebritura ukrainase q\u00eb vazhdojn\u00eb qysh nga qershori kan\u00eb p\u00ebrfunduar thuajse gjithmon\u00eb me nj\u00eb gjakderdhje, me pak fitime territoriale. T\u00eb pakt\u00ebn n\u00eb aspektin teorik trupat ruse mund ta ruanin ende qytetin, sidomos po t\u00eb kihet parasysh se shumica e popullsis\u00eb lokale dukej se e mb\u00ebshteste dominimin rus dhe se ardhja e sezonit dim\u00ebror do ta b\u00ebj\u00eb shum\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00eb organizimin e iniciativave sulmuese. Megjithat\u00eb, t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn n\u00eb planin ushtarak, ai i l\u00ebnies s\u00eb Khersonit ka qen\u00eb nj\u00eb vendim n\u00eb kompleks kuptimplot\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Faktikisht, n\u00ebn k\u00ebt\u00eb aspekt, avantazhet e nj\u00eb vendimi t\u00eb till\u00eb jan\u00eb t\u00eb dukshme. Megjith\u00ebse t\u00eb mjaftueshme p\u00ebr ta ruajtur rajonin, 30000 ushtar\u00ebt rus\u00eb me ndalim n\u00eb Kherson qen\u00eb t\u00eb pamjaftueshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb nj\u00eb sulm mbi Nikolaev, q\u00eb do t\u00eb krijonte nj\u00eb kufi t\u00eb ri t\u00eb mbrojtsh\u00ebm p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb Bugut jugor dhe Ingulit. K\u00ebshtu\u00eb, vija e frontit gjendej n\u00eb nj\u00eb zon\u00eb t\u00eb shesht\u00eb q\u00eb i kushtohej mir\u00eb kund\u00ebrofensivave eventuale ukrainase. P\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, duke filluar nga korriku, ura Antonovskij \u00ebsht\u00eb goditur n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrs\u00ebritur nga raketat HIMARS e furnizuara nga Shtetet e Bashkuara, q\u00eb megjith\u00ebse duke mos e shkat\u00ebrruar e kan\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb t\u00eb pavepruesh\u00ebm, duke i shtr\u00ebnguar rus\u00ebt t\u00eb p\u00ebrdorin ura varkash p\u00ebr ta furnizuar bregun e djatht\u00eb. Dniepri, gjat\u00ebsia e t\u00eb cilin n\u00eb disa aspekte arrin n\u00eb 23 kilometra, \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb fakt barriera m\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme natyrale m\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme midis Vollg\u00ebs dhe Karpateve dhe, p\u00ebrve\u00e7se \u00ebsht\u00eb leht\u00ebsisht e mbrojtshme, mund\u00ebson edhe t\u00eb \u00e7lirohen ushtar\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u2019u p\u00ebrdorur n\u00eb oblastin e Zaporozhesit dhe, ku sipas shum\u00eb raportimeve, \u00ebsht\u00eb e mundur nj\u00eb ofensiv\u00eb ukrainase n\u00eb drejtim t\u00eb Berdjanskut e Melitopolit dhe n\u00eb Donbas, ku fronti \u00ebsht\u00eb pothuajse stacionar prej jav\u00ebsh, me objektivin e ngrirjes s\u00eb fronteve apo t\u00eb kompletimit t\u00eb disa arritjeve aktualisht n\u00eb zhvillim (n\u00eb ve\u00e7anti Artemovsk\/Bachmut dhe Avdeevka) n\u00eb pritje q\u00eb ardhja e p\u00ebrforcimeve, paraliza e logjistik\u00ebs ukrainase q\u00eb buron nga shkat\u00ebrrimi metodik i infrastrukturave energjitike dhe fundi i sezonit dim\u00ebror b\u00ebjn\u00eb t\u00eb mundur rikthimin e sulmit.<\/p>\n

K\u00ebtyre koordinatave, me karakter taktik, i shtohen dy me karakter strategjik. N\u00ebse motivi zyrtar i luft\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb \u00e7lirimi i Donbasit dhe m\u00eb n\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsi ai i atyre territoreve ukrainase ku pjesa m\u00eb e madhe e popullsis\u00eb identifikohet n\u00eb konceptin Russkij Mir<\/em>, n\u00eb rregullat e objektivave kryesor\u00eb strategjik\u00eb ruse \u00ebsht\u00eb krijuar nj\u00eb korridor tok\u00ebsor midis Krimes\u00eb dhe Donbasit, duke parandaluar nj\u00eb mbytje t\u00eb mundshme t\u00eb Taurides n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet Detit t\u00eb Zi dhe Detit Azov, t\u2019i garantoj\u00eb Krimes\u00eb vet\u00ebmjaftueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb hidrike dhe energjitike dhe t\u00eb krijoj\u00eb nj\u00eb kufi t\u00eb mbrojtsh\u00ebm n\u00eb per\u00ebndim t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb. P\u00ebr sa i p\u00ebrket pik\u00ebs s\u00eb dyt\u00eb rezulton m\u00eb e qart\u00eb se n\u00eb Kherson objektivi kryesor strategjik rus i Kherson\u0161\u010dina<\/em> t\u00eb jet\u00eb qyteti Novaja Kachovka, n\u00eb bregun lindor t\u00eb Boristenes, pik\u00ebnisje e kanalit p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebs p\u00ebr furnizimin me uj\u00eb t\u00eb gadishullit. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, mang\u00ebsia e ujit ka qen\u00eb gjithmon\u00eb nj\u00eb prej problemeve m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha t\u00eb Krimes\u00eb dhe vet\u00eb transferimi i Krimes\u00eb p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn i 1954, zyrtarisht i motivuar nga p\u00ebrvjetori i 300 i atij Traktati t\u00eb Perejaslavit q\u00eb historiografia ruse e celebron gjithmon\u00eb si aktin e ribashkimit midis Rusis\u00eb dhe Ukrain\u00ebs, qe i motivuar n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe nga nd\u00ebrtimi i kanalit t\u00eb m\u00ebsip\u00ebrm, n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet t\u00eb cilit do t\u00eb g\u00ebzonte furnizime masive me uj\u00eb ukrainas. N\u00eb vijim t\u00eb aneksimit rus t\u00eb Krimes\u00eb t\u00eb 2014, zyrtarisht p\u00ebr borxhet ndaj furnizimeve t\u00eb m\u00ebparshme, Ukraina e bllokoi fluksin e ujit n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet kanalit, duke e goditur r\u00ebnd\u00eb prodhimin bujq\u00ebsor dhe furnizimet hidrike kan\u00eb rifilluar vet\u00ebm m\u00eb 26 shkurt 2022, n\u00eb vijim t\u00eb ardhjes s\u00eb forcave ruse n\u00eb Novaja Kachovka.<\/p>\n

Kurse pika e dyt\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb komplekse. Ka mund\u00ebsi Rusia do t\u00eb preferonte t\u00eb arrinte deri n\u00eb Dniest\u00ebr, lumin q\u00eb gjenerali Suvorov e shikonte si limesin<\/em> per\u00ebndimor t\u00eb Russkij Mir<\/em>. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb, vendi do t\u00eb pushtonte Nikolaev dhe Odes\u00ebn, duke e privuar Ukrain\u00eb nga nj\u00eb akses n\u00eb det dhe rilidhur Transnistrin\u00eb me m\u00ebm\u00ebdheun. N\u00eb k\u00ebmbim, Rusia ka mund\u00ebsi q\u00eb t\u2019i jepte okejin aneksimit rumun t\u00eb Moldavis\u00eb, Buxhakut dhe t\u00eb oblastit t\u00eb \u00c7erniv\u00e7it, q\u00eb deri n\u00eb 1940 i p\u00ebrkisnin Rumanis\u00eb. Megjithat\u00eb, humbja n\u00eb betej\u00ebn e Voznesenskit ka bllokuar nj\u00eb tentativ\u00eb fillestare ruse p\u00ebr ta arritur Dniestrin dhe t\u00ebrheqjen nga Khersoni me hedhjen n\u00eb er\u00eb t\u00eb urave mbi Dniep\u00ebr e ka b\u00ebr\u00eb thuajse t\u00eb pamundur t\u00eb kjo t\u00eb ndodh\u00eb. At\u00ebhere kur kufijt\u00eb e rinj\u00eb do t\u00eb duhej t\u00eb testoheshin n\u00eb Dniep\u00ebr, Kremlini do ta shikonte got\u00ebn gjysm\u00eb plot: Rusia do t\u00eb hiqte dor\u00eb p\u00ebrgjithmon\u00eb nga Odessa, me natyr\u00ebn e saj kozmopolite t\u00eb lidhur ngusht\u00ebsisht me epok\u00ebn perandorake dhe teatrin e nj\u00eb prej episodeve m\u00eb dramatike t\u00eb protestave proruse t\u00eb 2014 (masakra e Odes\u00ebs), por nj\u00eb kufi n\u00eb Dniep\u00ebr, q\u00eb gjat\u00eb historis\u00eb ka luajtur n\u00eb shum\u00eb raste rolin e limesit<\/em> t\u00eb bot\u00ebs ruse, do t\u2019i garantonte vendin kontrollin thuajse total t\u00eb brigjeve veriore t\u00eb Detit t\u00eb Zi, duke krijuar nj\u00eb barrier\u00eb thuajse t\u00eb pakalueshme n\u00eb mbrojtje t\u00eb Krimes\u00eb dhe duke parandaluar tashm\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrmendur\u00ebn mbytje t\u00eb der\u00ebs kryesore t\u00eb aksesit t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb detet e ngrohta.<\/p>\n

Megjithat\u00eb, n\u00eb planin politik situata \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb ndryshe. T\u00ebrheqja nga Khersoni, m\u00eb shum\u00eb akoma se atentati n\u00eb ur\u00ebn e Krimes\u00eb \u2013 afatet e shpejta e rind\u00ebrtimit t\u00eb pjes\u00ebve \u00eb shkat\u00ebrruara, p\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr n\u00eb koh\u00eb lufte dhe sanksionesh, bile mund t\u00eb b\u00ebhen nj\u00eb motiv krenarie \u2013 dhe i humbjes taktike n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn lindore t\u00eb oblastit t\u00eb Harkovit, p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb nj\u00eb kafshat\u00eb shum\u00eb t\u00eb hidhur. N\u00eb ndryshim nga kjo e fundit, sipas ligjit rus pjesa per\u00ebndimore e oblastit t\u00eb Khersonit \u00ebsht\u00eb zyrtarisht territor rus dhe ta l\u00ebsh pasi q\u00eb pjesa d\u00ebrrmuese e popullsis\u00eb t\u00eb tij ka zgjedhur aneksimin ndaj Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb referendum sigurisht t\u00eb diskutuesh\u00ebm, por q\u00eb nuk do t\u00eb kishte qen\u00eb i mundur at\u00ebhere kur nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb e popullsis\u00eb t\u00eb mos kishte qen\u00eb dakord, p\u00ebrb\u00ebn nj\u00eb humbje t\u00eb qart\u00eb besueshm\u00ebrie dhe pavar\u00ebsisht se autoritetet ruse kan\u00eb folur p\u00ebr nj\u00eb t\u00ebrheqje t\u00eb p\u00ebrkohshme, nj\u00eb rimarrje e Khersonit n\u00eb muajt e ardhsh\u00ebm \u00ebsht\u00eb praktikisht e pamundur (p\u00ebrve\u00e7se nuk i p\u00ebrgjigjet atyre logjikave ushtarake q\u00eb tani mbizot\u00ebrojn\u00eb n\u00eb menaxhimin e konfliktit).<\/p>\n

\u00cbsht\u00eb e mundur q\u00eb humbja e Khersonit t\u2019i mund\u00ebsoj\u00eb Rusis\u00eb t\u00eb mbaj\u00eb Berdjanskun e Melitopolin, humbja eventuale e t\u00eb cilave do t\u00eb kishte nj\u00eb d\u00ebm jo vet\u00ebm imazhi, por edhe strategjik; megjithat\u00eb vendimi ka pasur nj\u00eb impakt t\u00eb fort\u00eb mbi moralin e ushtar\u00ebve, shpesh pa besim tek vendimi, nd\u00ebrsa n\u00eb syt\u00eb e atyre 120000 refugjat\u00ebve q\u00eb ka shum\u00eb mund\u00ebsi nuk do t\u2019i shikojn\u00eb m\u00eb sht\u00ebpit\u00eb e tyre mbizot\u00ebron tradh\u00ebtia. Rreziqet e t\u00ebrheqjes nga Khersoni n\u00eb terma t\u00eb stabilitetit politik jan\u00eb p\u00ebr momentin t\u00eb pak\u00ebta, por nuk p\u00ebrjashtohet q\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb ardhmen t\u00eb mund t\u00eb rriten. K\u00ebta refugjat\u00eb, bashk\u00eb me t\u00eb mbijetuarit dhe nacionalist\u00ebt, mund t\u00eb b\u00ebhen faktikisht baza p\u00ebr nj\u00eb l\u00ebvizje masive, nd\u00ebrsa qysh sot Partia Komuniste aktualisht n\u00eb opozit\u00eb ka paraqitur nj\u00eb seanc\u00eb pyetjesh n\u00eb Dum\u00eb lidhur me at\u00eb q\u00eb e quan \u201cnj\u00eb t\u00ebrheqje pa luftuar\u201d dhe filozofi Aleksandr Dugin, n\u00eb nj\u00eb deklarat\u00eb misterioze, m\u00eb pas t\u00eb fshir\u00eb, pasi e ka quajtur t\u00ebrheqjen nga Khersoni \u201cvija e kuqe e fundit e pranueshme\u201d do t\u00eb afirmonte se sovrani q\u00eb nuk mbron n\u00ebnshtetasit e tij \u201ci takon fati i mbretit t\u00eb shirave\u201d, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb ekzekutimi. Nj\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim i fsheht\u00eb p\u00ebr Putinin? N\u00eb syt\u00eb e ciklonit, p\u00ebr momentin, jan\u00eb sidomos menaxhimi i kaluar i pushtimit, n\u00eb kompleks i matur, dhe komponentet e mbetura proper\u00ebndimore t\u00eb politik\u00ebs dhe t\u00eb popullsis\u00eb ruse; por nj\u00eb luft\u00eb faljesh si kjo n\u00eb zhvillim akuza m\u00eb e keqe \u00ebsht\u00eb tradh\u00ebtia dhe at\u00ebhere kur duhet t\u00eb jet\u00eb humbje t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme cari mund t\u00eb jet\u00eb objekt teorish\u00eb komploti t\u00eb af\u00ebrta me Dolchsto\u00dflegende<\/em> n\u00eb Gjermanin\u00eb e Veimarit q\u00eb n\u00eb perspektiv\u00eb mund t\u2019i minojn\u00eb besueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Por, nga ana tjet\u00ebr, vendimi p\u00ebr t\u2019u t\u00ebrhequr nga bregu per\u00ebndimor i lumit Dniep\u00ebr \u00ebsht\u00eb pritur me shum\u00eb favor pik\u00ebrisht nga ata \u201cfajkoj\u201d q\u00eb n\u00eb koh\u00ebn e tyre e pat\u00ebn kritikuar fuqimisht menaxhimin e operacionit special, ngurrimit p\u00ebr t\u00eb k\u00ebrkuar mobilizimin t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn t\u00eb pjessh\u00ebm dhe munges\u00ebn e nj\u00eb fushate sistematike bombardimesh ndaj infrastrukturave strategjike sipas modelit, p\u00ebr shembull, shock and awe<\/em> t\u00eb zbatuar nga Shtetet e Bashkuara n\u00eb Irak. P\u00ebr Evgenij Prigozhin, themelues i Grupit Wagner, ai i l\u00ebnies s\u00eb Khersonit ka qen\u00eb \u201cnj\u00eb vendim i v\u00ebshtir\u00eb, por q\u00eb demonstron disponueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e komand\u00ebs p\u00ebr t\u00eb marr\u00eb p\u00ebrsip\u00ebr p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsin\u00eb e jet\u00ebs s\u00eb ushtar\u00ebve\u201d. T\u00ebrheqja e trupave me humbje minimale, shton Prigozhin, \u201cnuk i nderon arm\u00ebt ruse, por n\u00ebnvizon cil\u00ebsit\u00eb e komandantit, q\u00eb ka vepruar si nj\u00eb njeri q\u00eb nuk e ka frik\u00ebn e p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsis\u00eb\u201d. Deklarimi \u00ebsht\u00eb ndjekur menj\u00ebher\u00eb nga ai i Kadirovit, q\u00eb ka n\u00ebnvizuar v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsin\u00eb e ndalimit t\u00eb furnizimeve n\u00eb zon\u00ebn e Khersonit dhe fakti q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb e leht\u00eb t\u00eb organizohet mbrojtja n\u00eb an\u00ebn e majt\u00eb t\u00eb Boristenes. Demonstrime q\u00eb demonstrojn\u00eb kapitalin politik e Gjeneralit Armageddon, q\u00eb pasi i ka dh\u00ebn\u00eb nj\u00eb spostim t\u00eb vendosur ecuris\u00eb s\u00eb operacionit special duke bombardurar n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb kirurgjikale infrastrukturat energjitike ukrainase ka mundur t\u00eb marr\u00eb nj\u00eb vendim jopopullor, por n\u00eb kompleks t\u00eb dobishme p\u00ebr arritjen e objektivave strategjike ruse.<\/p>\n

Pastaj \u00ebsht\u00eb e mundur q\u00eb t\u00ebrheqja nga Khersoni \u00ebsht\u00eb pjes\u00eb e nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshjeje jo t\u00eb shkruar midis Rusis\u00eb dhe Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara, si\u00e7 ka afirmuar analisti gjeopolitik brazilian Pepe Escobar. N\u00eb nj\u00eb komunikat\u00eb n\u00eb Telegram<\/em> t\u00eb 10 n\u00ebntorit, ka folur p\u00ebr nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje midis K\u00ebshilltarit p\u00ebr Sigurin\u00eb Komb\u00ebtare amerikan Jake Sullivan dhe homologut t\u00eb tij rus Nikolaj Patrushev, n\u00eb baz\u00eb t\u00eb t\u00eb cilit Dniepri b\u00ebhet kufiri i ri midis Rusis\u00eb dhe Ukrain\u00ebs. E b\u00ebr\u00eb gjat\u00eb telefonatave t\u00eb shumta midis t\u00eb dyve \u2013 e fundit q\u00eb i p\u00ebrket vet\u00ebm 3 dit\u00ebve nga njoftimi i t\u00ebrheqjes \u2013 marr\u00ebveshja do t\u00eb paraqitej nga Sullivan p\u00ebr Kievin gjat\u00eb vizit\u00ebs s\u00eb tij t\u00eb fundit dhe Ukraina, tashm\u00eb krejt\u00ebsisht e varur krejt\u00ebsisht nga ndihmat ushtarake per\u00ebndimore, nuk do t\u2019i mbetej ve\u00e7se t\u00eb firmoste. Sigurisht q\u00eb n\u00eb Donbas vazhdohet t\u00eb luftohet, por n\u00eb Dniep\u00ebr loj\u00ebrat mund t\u00eb kryhen dhe, at\u00ebhere kur kjo hipotez\u00eb do t\u00eb duhej t\u00eb rezultonte e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb, Boristene do t\u00eb kthehet t\u00eb luaj\u00eb at\u00eb rol limesi<\/em> midis Rusis\u00eb dhe Per\u00ebndimit katolik e protestant q\u00eb ka luajtur n\u00eb mbi nj\u00eb nj\u00eb shekulli e kaluar midis Arm\u00ebpushimit t\u00eb Andrushovos s\u00eb 1667 dhe Ndarjes s\u00eb Polonis\u00eb s\u00eb 1793. N\u00eb mos de jure<\/em>, t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn de facto<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Provat n\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetje t\u00eb tez\u00ebs s\u00eb t\u00ebrheqjes s\u00eb negociuar jan\u00eb t\u00eb ndryshme. N\u00eb ndryshim nga Franca dhe Ukraina, q\u00eb njoftimit t\u00eb t\u00ebrheqjes ruse i jan\u00eb frik\u00ebsuar ndonj\u00eb kurthi, n\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara lajmi \u00ebsht\u00eb pritur me surpriz\u00eb t\u00eb madhe: CNN e ka quajtur t\u00ebrheqjen \u201cposht\u00ebruese, por jo befasuese\u201d dhe vet\u00eb administrata dukej se ishte n\u00eb nj\u00eb far\u00eb m\u00ebnyre n\u00eb korrent t\u00eb atyre q\u00eb po ndodhnin. Qysh nga fillimet e tetorit \u00ebsht\u00eb folur shum\u00eb p\u00ebr traktativa sekrete midis Uashingtonit dhe Mosk\u00ebs, t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebsuar nga nj\u00eb vend arab q\u00eb sipas t\u00eb gjitha gjasave \u00ebsht\u00eb Arabia Saudite. Telefonatat midis K\u00ebshilltarit p\u00ebr Sigurin\u00eb Komb\u00ebtare rus Nikolaj Patrushev dhe homologut t\u00eb tij amerikan Jake Sullivan, me p\u00ebrmbajtje jo t\u00eb zbuluar, kan\u00eb qen\u00eb t\u00eb shumta n\u00eb koh\u00ebt e fundit, e fundit e ndodhur vet\u00eb m 3 dit\u00eb nga njoftimi i t\u00ebrheqjes dhe, sipas \u201cWall Street Journal\u201d, ky i fundit ka ftuar Zelenskijn t\u00eb adoptoj\u00eb nj\u00eb pozicion negociues \u201crealist\u201d n\u00eb traktativat me Putinin. T\u00eb nes\u00ebrmen e njoftimit t\u00eb t\u00ebrheqjes ruse, shefi i Shtamadhoris\u00eb amerikane Mark Milley ka pohuar se nj\u00eb ng\u00ebr\u00e7 ushtarak dim\u00ebror hap nj\u00eb \u201cdritare mund\u00ebsie\u201d p\u00ebr trakativat e paqes midis Rusis\u00eb dhe Ukrain\u00ebs, duke n\u00ebnvizuar sesi \u00ebsht\u00eb prioritare p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn t\u00eb \u00e7imentoj\u00eb fitimet e siguruara, duke uruar n\u00eb \u00e7do rast q\u00eb t\u00eb dy pal\u00ebt n\u00eb konflikt t\u00eb pranojn\u00eb parimin q\u00eb nuk mund t\u2019i arirjn\u00eb objektivat e tyre manu militari<\/em> dhe, n\u00eb vijim t\u00eb incidentit t\u00eb fundit t\u00eb Przewod\u00f3w, Rusia ka lavd\u00ebruar p\u00ebrgjigjen e \u201cmatur\u201d amerikane me goj\u00ebn e z\u00ebdh\u00ebn\u00ebsit t\u00eb Putinit, Dmitrij Peskov.<\/p>\n

Sinjale de-escalation<\/em>, ato nga ana amerikane, p\u00ebrcaktohen nga faktor\u00eb t\u00eb ndrysh\u00ebm. Kryesori \u00ebsht\u00eb pamund\u00ebsia e mb\u00ebshtetjes s\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs me ritmet e muajve t\u00eb kaluara \u201cderikur do t\u00eb jet\u00eb e nevojshme\u201d, p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrmendur nj\u00eb slogan q\u00eb e kemi d\u00ebgjuar shum\u00eb shpesh n\u00eb muajt e kaluar. Eskortat e armatimeve t\u00eb Per\u00ebndimit po ezaurohen, si\u00e7 thekson nj\u00eb analiz\u00eb e Bloomberg<\/em>, dhe sipas analistit gjeopolitik Andrea Gaspardo piku i furnizimeve per\u00ebndimore \u00ebsht\u00eb arritur midis qershorit dhe korrikut, p\u00ebr t\u00eb filluar m\u00eb pas me nj\u00eb ngadal\u00ebsim t\u00eb pakt\u00eb, por konstant. Gjith\u00e7ka tensa potenciali rus i pashprehur \u00ebsht\u00eb ende i madh. I dyti \u00ebsht\u00eb i tipit gjeostrategjik: armiku i v\u00ebrtet\u00eb p\u00ebr Shtetet e Bashkuara n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb moment nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb Moska, por Pekini, dhe vazhdimi p\u00ebrtej i konfliktit n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb n\u00ebnkupton t\u00eb privohet Taipei nga arm\u00ebt, shum\u00eb m\u00eb i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm se Kievi p\u00ebr Shtetet e Bashkuara. Jo rast\u00ebsisht Milley, q\u00eb n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebllumb, n\u00eb Detin Kinez b\u00ebhet nj\u00eb fajkua dhe koh\u00ebt e fundit ka paralajm\u00ebruar dikur Perandorin\u00eb Qiellore t\u00eb \u201cmarr\u00eb m\u00ebsime nga Ukraina\u201d at\u00ebhere kur t\u00eb k\u00ebrkonte t\u00eb pushtonte ish Kin\u00ebn Komb\u00ebtare. S\u00eb fundi, i treti \u00ebsht\u00eb mbajtja e frontit europian, ku \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb rritje pak\u00ebnaq\u00ebsia e opinionit publik ndaj nj\u00eb lufte q\u00eb shkakton nj\u00eb rritje t\u00eb fort\u00eb t\u00eb inflacionit dhe probleme serioze n\u00eb furnizimin me l\u00ebnd\u00eb t\u00eb para dhe pjes\u00ebrisht n\u00eb frontin e brendsh\u00ebm, ku n\u00eb linj\u00eb maksimale theksohet Ukraina, por mazhoranca nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb kund\u00ebr l\u00ebshimeve Rusis\u00eb. Si\u00e7 e kujtojm\u00eb, lufta \u00ebsht\u00eb edhe produkti i vullnetit anglosakson p\u00ebr ta ridimensionuar nj\u00eb konkurrent t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm dhe t\u00eb reduktoj\u00eb autonomin\u00eb strategjike europiane, me referim t\u00eb ve\u00e7ant\u00eb ndaj furnizimit me hidrokarbure; por, n\u00eb nj\u00eb kontekst si ky aktuali, t\u00ebrehqja e fort\u00eb e litarit n\u00ebnkupton t\u00eb krijohet nj\u00eb efekt bumerang.<\/p>\n

Gjith\u00e7ka ka krijuar jo pak f\u00ebrkime me Ukrain\u00ebn, si\u00e7 ndodh shpesh n\u00eb luft\u00ebrat e faljes midis pjes\u00ebmarr\u00ebsve t\u00eb nivelit t\u00eb par\u00eb e t\u00eb dyt\u00eb (ata t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb direkt n\u00eb konflikt dhe ata q\u00eb marrin pjes\u00eb, direkt apo indirekt, n\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetje t\u00eb dikujt tjet\u00ebr). Fillimisht nlntok\u00ebsore, t\u00eb lidhura me refuzimin amerikan e krijimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb no-fly zone<\/em> mbi Ukrain\u00ebn dhe d\u00ebrgimin e arm\u00ebve me rreze t\u00eb gjat\u00eb si raketal\u00ebshuesit ATACMS, tensionet jan\u00eb shfaqur n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb t\u00eb qart\u00eb nl vijim t\u00eb atentateve si vrasja e Darja Dugin\u00ebs n\u00eb Mosk\u00eb dhe autobomb\u00ebs n\u00eb ur\u00ebn e Krimes\u00eb, q\u00eb vet\u00eb sh\u00ebrbimet sekrete amerikane, n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet rrjedhjeve p\u00ebr \u201cNew York Times\u201d, ua kan\u00eb atribuar atyre ukrainas, duke konfirmuar k\u00ebshtu versionin e Mosk\u00ebs. Tensionet kan\u00eb shp\u00ebrthyer koh\u00ebt e fundit n\u00eb nj\u00eb kontrast t\u00eb hapur midis Bidenit dhe Zelenskijt, p\u00ebr shembull kur ky i fundit ka refuzuar versionin zyrtar t\u00eb incidentit t\u00eb Przewod\u00f3w duke k\u00ebmb\u00ebngulur se raketa n\u00eb fjal\u00eb ishte ruse dhe jo ukrainase, nd\u00ebrsa eksponent\u00eb t\u00eb ndrysh\u00ebm t\u00eb Partis\u00eb Republikane dhe personalitete si opinionisti popullor Tucker Carlson pyesin hapur mbi mund\u00ebsin\u00eb e mb\u00ebshtetjes t\u00eb atij q\u00eb \u00a0tashm\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb nj\u00eb aleat problematik, n\u00eb stilin Noriega apo si presidenti fundit i Vietnamit t\u00eb Jugut Nguy\u1ec5n V\u0103n Thi\u1ec7u.<\/p>\n

Por edhe k\u00ebtu ar\u00ebsyet ushtarake jan\u00eb t\u00eb ndryshme nga ato politike dhe jo t\u00eb gjith\u00eb jan\u00eb dakord me Milley n\u00eb shtetin q\u00eb m\u00ebs shum\u00eb se \u00e7do tjet\u00ebr ka fuqin\u00eb t\u00eb mund ta mbaroj\u00eb luft\u00ebn. Faktikisht, megjithse duke mos e refuzur direkt shefin e Shtatmadhoris\u00eb, personalitete si Biden, Blinken dhe vet\u00eb Sullivan kan\u00eb deklaruar se nuk do t\u00eb ushtrojn\u00eb presione ndaj Ukrain\u00ebs me q\u00ebllim q\u00eb t\u2019i shtohet nj\u00eb zgjidhjeje diplomatike, duke n\u00ebnvizuar se \u201ci takon Ukrain\u00ebs t\u00eb vendos\u00eb se kur do t\u00eb hyj\u00eb n\u00eb traktativa\u201d. Presionet p\u00ebr vazhdimin e luft\u00ebs jan\u00eb ende shum\u00eb t\u00eb forta: mocioni me t\u00eb cilin caucus<\/em> progresist i Partis\u00eb Demokratike i ka d\u00ebrguar administrat\u00ebs Biden t\u2019i hapet perspektiv\u00ebs s\u00eb nj\u00eb zgjidhjeje t\u00eb negociuar t\u00eb konfliktit dhe krijmit t\u00eb nj\u00eb arkitekture t\u00eb re p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb europiane \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00ebrhequr menj\u00ebher\u00eb dhe triumfi i munguar n\u00eb zgjedhjet e fundit afatmesme i Partis\u00eb Republikane tashm\u00eb fuqimisht trumpiane sigurisht q\u00eb nuk ka ndihmuar. Vet\u00eb ftesa p\u00ebr Zelenskijn q\u00eb t\u00eb tregoj\u00eb nj\u00eb fleksibilitet m\u00eb t\u00eb madh n\u00eb traktativa ka par\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb perspektiv\u00eb ku Shtetet e Bashkuara synojn\u00eb ta mbajn\u00eb t\u00eb paprekur frontin per\u00ebndimor, sidomos n\u00eb n\u00eb Europ\u00eb ku jo t\u00eb gjith\u00eb duan t\u00eb rrezikojn\u00eb nj\u00eb luft\u00eb pafund.<\/p>\n

Ve\u00e7 k\u00ebsaj nuk duhet harruar se q\u00ebllimi final i politik\u00ebs amerikane n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb, sot si n\u00eb 2014, \u00ebsht\u00eb \u201ct\u2019i jap\u00eb nj\u00eb m\u00ebsim\u201d Rusis\u00eb, q\u00eb ta detyroj\u00eb t\u00eb pranoj\u00eb at\u00eb rol t\u00eb fuqis\u00eb rajonale q\u00eb Obama i kishte caktuar t\u00eb nes\u00ebrmen e kriz\u00ebs s\u00eb Krimes\u00eb dhe q\u00eb sh\u00ebrben si paralajm\u00ebrim p\u00ebr t\u00eb gjitha ato fuqi q\u00eb mund t\u00eb sfidojn\u00eb primatin amerikan, Kina in primis<\/em>. Gjith\u00eb k\u00ebsaj i shtohet nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr objektiv strategjik: prishja e aksit potencial strategjik midis Rusis\u00eb dhe Bashkimit Europian, i bazuar mbi komplemntaritetin midis resurseve natyrale t\u00eb s\u00eb par\u00ebs dhe industris\u00eb t\u00eb s\u00eb dyt\u00ebs. Objektiv strategjik i ndar\u00eb p\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr nga Mbret\u00ebria e Bashkuara, q\u00eb n\u00eb vijim t\u00eb Brexit<\/em> i ka rritur distancat e saj nga Franca e Gjermania dhe ka par\u00eb tek vendet e t\u00eb ashtuquajtur\u00ebs \u201cEurop\u00eb t\u00eb Mesit\u201d (sidomos tek Polonia, vendet balltike, Finlanda dhe Rumania) nj\u00eb mund\u00ebsi t\u00eb \u00e7muar p\u00ebr t\u00eb krijuar nj\u00eb pyk\u00eb midis Rusis\u00eb dhe Gjermanis\u00eb, duke i dob\u00ebsuar t\u00eb dyja dhe duke i rilidhur n\u00eb nj\u00eb sfer\u00eb influence brenda Bashkimit Europian. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb aspekt, Mbret\u00ebria e Bashkuar \u00ebsht\u00eb edhe m\u00eb radikale se States<\/em>, duke pasur n\u00eb loj\u00eb interesa strategjike direkte dhe n\u00eb prillin e kaluar qe kryeministri i at\u00ebhersh\u00ebm Boris Johnson q\u00eb b\u00ebri t\u00eb d\u00ebshtoj\u00eb takimi tashm\u00eb i af\u00ebrt midis Putinit dhe Zelenskijt, prelud i n\u00ebnshkrimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje paqeje. Spiralja stagflacioniste ku ka hyr\u00eb Mbret\u00ebria e Bashkuar, pjes\u00ebrisht e lidhur me luft\u00ebn, mund ta shtyjn\u00eb t\u2019i redukoj\u00eb ndihmat p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn, qysh sot duksh\u00ebm inferiore ndaj atyre amerikane, dhe ndoshta edhe t\u2019i reduktoj\u00eb shpenzimet ushtarake, por t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb e administrat\u00ebs dhe e aparateve amerikane ka interes ta vazhdoj\u00eb luft\u00ebn dhe vet\u00eb ftesa ndaj Zelenskij p\u00ebr t\u00eb treguar fleksibilitet t\u00eb madh n\u00eb traktativa\u00a0 duhet par\u00eb edhe n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb pptik\u00eb. Presidenti ukrainas duhet t\u00eb tregohet i hapur ndaj dialogut edhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb pranueshme furnizimet me arm\u00eb p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn n\u00eb syt\u00eb e opinionit publik, sidomos n\u00eb vende si Italia, Francia dhe Germania.<\/p>\n

P\u00ebr pasoj\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00ebrheqja nga Khersoni t\u00eb jet\u00eb pasoj\u00eb direkte e traktativave n\u00ebntok\u00ebsore. Prania e kontakteve t\u00eb nivelit t\u00eb lart\u00eb midis rus\u00ebve dhe amerikan\u00ebve, tashm\u00eb jo edhe aq sekrete, \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb e dh\u00ebn\u00eb faktike dhe nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e pamundur q\u00eb k\u00ebta t\u00eb jen\u00eb n\u00eb korrent t\u00eb vendimit rus. Por faktor\u00ebt ushtarake q\u00eb kan\u00eb influencuar vendimin rus kan\u00eb nj\u00eb pesh\u00eb jo t\u00eb pak\u00ebt, nd\u00ebrsa p\u00ebr momentin nj\u00eb marrveshje eventuale n\u00ebn gjurm\u00ebn e kufijve t\u00eb rinj t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs p\u00ebr momentin do t\u00eb shikohej si nj\u00eb tradh\u00ebti sa e Uashingtonit, aq edhe e Mosk\u00ebs. Megjithat\u00eb kjo nuk e mohon faktin q\u00eb paqja n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb do t\u00eb jet\u00eb thuajse me siguri rezultati i traktativave direkte midis Rusis\u00eb dhe Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara, ndoshta me nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebsimin e nj\u00eb Turqie q\u00eb megjith\u00ebse duket qen\u00eb an\u00ebtare e NATO \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb raporte t\u00eb mira me Mosk\u00ebn, dhe ka mund\u00ebsi d\u00eb t\u00eb implikoj\u00eb nj\u00eb rirregullim t\u00eb t\u00ebr\u00eb t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs Lindire, me referim ndaj t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn nj\u00eb pjese t\u00eb konflikteve t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb ngrira q\u00eb p\u00ebrfshijn\u00eb rajonin. N\u00eb nj\u00eb kontekst ku edhe fitorja totale e nj\u00ebr\u00ebs prej pal\u00ebve \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebr momentin e pamundur, vendimet emotivisht t\u00eb v\u00ebshtira jan\u00eb t\u00eb pashmangshme: n\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, si\u00e7 shkruan Huntington tek P\u00ebrplasja e qytet\u00ebrimeve<\/em> \u201cn\u00eb nj\u00eb luft\u00eb faljesh tradh\u00ebtia ndaj rac\u00ebs t\u00ebnde \u00ebsht\u00eb \u00e7mimi p\u00ebr t\u2019u paguar p\u00ebr ta arritur paqen\u201d.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb marr\u00ebveshjen e Minskut Rusis\u00eb i \u00ebsht\u00eb dashur t\u00eb mbaj\u00eb n\u00ebn fre irredentizmin e republikave popullore t\u00eb Donjeckut dhe Luhanskut, q\u00eb i \u00ebsht\u00eb dashur n\u00eb linj\u00eb parimore t\u00eb pranoj\u00eb iden\u00eb e nj\u00eb riintegrimi n\u00eb shtetin ukrainas dhe heqjen dor\u00eb nga qytetet e rimarra nga ukrainasit gjat\u00eb luft\u00ebs, si Slavjansku dhe Lisi\u00e7anskut. Tani, ka shum\u00eb t\u00eb ngjar\u00eb, q\u00eb qengjat sakrifikues do t\u00eb jen\u00eb Transnistria \u2013 n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb besueshme do t\u2019i kthehet Moldavis\u00eb \u2013 dhe komponentja proruse e popullsis\u00eb s\u00eb Khersonit. N\u00eb an\u00ebn tjet\u00ebr t\u00eb frontit, slogani \u201casgj\u00eb p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn pa Ukrain\u00eb\u201d do t\u00eb rezultoj\u00eb n\u00eb momentin oportun si nj\u00eb instrument thjesht\u00eb retorik: n\u00eb konfliktet paqja \u00ebsht\u00eb frut i traktativave midis pjes\u00ebmarr\u00ebsve t\u00eb nivelit t\u00eb dyt\u00eb e t\u00eb tret\u00eb, nd\u00ebrsa direkt t\u00eb interesuarit kan\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrfshirje t\u00eb kufizuar, dhe jo rrall\u00eb paqja imponohet mbi p\u00ebrb\u00ebr\u00ebs tashm\u00eb t\u00eb konsumuar, si\u00e7 e demonstrojn\u00eb rastet e Bosnjes dhe t\u00eb Irland\u00ebs s\u00eb Veriut. Kafshata e hidhur, ka shum\u00eb t\u00eb ngjar\u00eb, do t\u00eb jet\u00eb heqja dor\u00eb nga territoret e banuara nga popullsi proruse, de facto<\/em> n\u00eb mos de jure<\/em>.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb linj\u00eb maksimale, zgjidhja e konfliktit do t\u00eb duhet t\u00eb kaloj\u00eb n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet 3 fazave: 1. Reduktimi i intensitetit (ose, n\u00eb alternativ\u00eb, nj\u00eb fitore vendimtare p\u00ebr nj\u00eb prej pal\u00ebve); 2. Koreanizimi i konfliktit, me arm\u00ebpushimin dhe ngrirjen e pozicioneve n\u00eb vet\u00eb momentin e tij; 3. Nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje paqeje.<\/p>\n

Megjithat\u00eb me q\u00ebllim q\u00eb t\u2019i shtohet k\u00ebsaj pike, do t\u00eb ishte oprtune q\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha pal\u00ebt t\u00eb arrinin n\u00eb nj\u00eb pik\u00eb ku pal\u00ebt t\u00eb pranojn\u00eb nj\u00eb kompromis. \u201cNdarja e Bosnjes midis nj\u00eb 51% n\u00eb kroat\u00eb e mysliman\u00eb dhe nj\u00eb 49% n\u00eb serb\u00eb\u201d, shkruan gjithmon\u00eb autori i P\u00ebrplasjes s\u00eb qytet\u00ebrimeve<\/em>, \u201cnuk ishte e praktikueshme n\u00eb 1994, kur serb\u00ebt kontrollonin 70% t\u00eb vendit, por u b\u00eb at\u00ebhere kur sulmet kroate dhe myslimane e reduktuan kontrolin serb n\u00eb m\u00eb pak se gjysm\u00ebn e territorit\u201d. Jo shum\u00eb ndryshe \u00ebsht\u00eb situata aktuale ukrainase. Di\u00e7ka jo shum\u00eb e ndryshme po ndodh n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb dhe nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u2019u habitur se nyja kryesore nuk \u00ebsht aderimi n\u00eb NATO (n\u00eb linj\u00eb maksimale, t\u00eb dyja pal\u00ebt kan\u00eb r\u00ebn\u00eb tashm\u00eb dakord mbi jo-n\u00eb e Ukrain\u00ebs n\u00eb NATO n\u00eb k\u00ebmbim t\u00eb garancive t\u00eb siguris\u00eb per\u00ebndimore), por \u00e7\u00ebshtjet territoriale. K\u00ebrkesa ruse e njohjes s\u00eb aneksimit t\u00eb Krimes\u00eb, e republikave t\u00eb Donbasit dhe e oblasteve t\u00eb Zaporozhjes dhe Kherson \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebr momentin e papranueshme p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn, q\u00eb n\u00eb 2 muajt e fundit ka rifituar jo pak terren. Nj\u00eblloj e papranueshme, k\u00ebsaj radhe p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb k\u00ebrkesa ukrainase p\u00ebr nj\u00eb t\u00ebrheqje t\u00eb pakusht\u00ebzuar nga rajonet e kontestuara si parakusht p\u00ebr nisjen e traktativave t\u00eb paqes, duke qen\u00eb se vendi, p\u00ebrve\u00e7se kontrollon ende rreth 20% t\u00eb territorit ukrainas, n\u00eb t\u00eb ardhmen e af\u00ebrt mund ta shikoj\u00eb er\u00ebn t\u00eb nd\u00ebrroj\u00eb n\u00eb favorin e saj.<\/p>\n

Prandaj \u00ebsht\u00eb e mundur q\u00eb nj\u00eb arm\u00ebpushim i v\u00ebrtet\u00eb do t\u00eb ndodh\u00eb vet\u00ebm n\u00ebse paraliza e logjistik\u00ebs ukrainase do t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktoj\u00eb nj\u00eb seri humbjesh ushtarake q\u00eb do ta \u00e7ojn\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebn dhe vendet per\u00ebndimore ta pranojn\u00eb iden\u00eb se nj\u00eb kompromis \u00ebsht\u00eb i preferuesh\u00ebm ndaj vazhdimit t\u00eb luft\u00ebs (opsioni tjet\u00ebr, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb nj\u00eb kolaps i forcave ruse, \u00ebsht\u00eb i pamundur). Me shum\u00eb mund\u00ebsi, kjo do t\u00eb ndodh\u00eb jo m\u00eb p\u00ebrpara pranver\u00ebs s\u00eb ardhshme dhe edhe at\u00ebhere kalimi nga arm\u00ebpushimi tek paqja nuk do t\u00eb jet\u00eb i menj\u00ebhersh\u00ebm. Zakonisht, n\u00eb luft\u00ebrat e faljes arm\u00ebpushimet jan\u00eb n\u00eb thelb nj\u00eb instrument p\u00ebr t\u00eb l\u00ebpir\u00eb plag\u00ebt e riorganizuar dhe marr\u00ebveshja e Minskut, q\u00eb n\u00eb praktik\u00eb kan\u00eb qen\u00eb nj\u00eb arm\u00ebpushim i armatosur, nuk jan\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrjashtim. Nj\u00eb paqe e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb, p\u00ebrve\u00e7se nj\u00eb rirregullim i p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm i Europ\u00ebs Qendrolindore, duhet t\u00eb bazohet edhe mbi rind\u00ebrtimin e raporteve ruso \u2013 ukrainase mbi baz\u00ebn e parimeve t\u00eb reja dhe me njohjen nga t\u00eb dyja pal\u00ebt e dinamikave t\u00eb ve\u00e7anta t\u00eb brendshme n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb, p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb vijave t\u00eb preambul\u00ebs s\u00eb marr\u00ebveshjes t\u00eb s\u00eb Premtes s\u00eb Shenjt\u00eb q\u00eb i dhan\u00eb fund konfliktit veriirlandez. Njohja nga ana e ruse e faktit q\u00eb, megjith\u00ebse n\u00eb nj\u00eb kontekst rr\u00ebnj\u00ebsh t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebta, pjesa m\u00eb e madhe e popullit ukrainas e d\u00ebshiron nj\u00eb integrim m\u00eb t\u00eb madh me Per\u00ebndimin dhe njohja nga ana ukrainase se nj\u00eb pakic\u00eb substanciale e popullsis\u00eb s\u00eb vendit d\u00ebshiron nj\u00eb bashkim me Rusin\u00eb apo sa m\u00eb pak raporte t\u00eb ngushta me N\u00ebn\u00ebn e Madhe, p\u00ebr momentin p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson nj\u00eb humbje p\u00ebr t\u00eb dyja pal\u00ebt; ama, p\u00ebrve\u00e7 nj\u00eb kolapsi t\u00eb nj\u00ebr\u00ebs prej pal\u00ebve, p\u00ebrb\u00ebjn\u00eb premis\u00ebn e domosdoshme p\u00ebr nd\u00ebrtimin e nj\u00eb paqeje pakashum\u00eb permanente.<\/p>\n

(nga Geopoliticus<\/em>)<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n

ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

M\u00eb 9 n\u00ebntor 2022, pas sugjerimit t\u00eb gjeneralit Surovikin, ministri i Mbrojtjes rus Sergej \u0160ojgu ka urdh\u00ebruar t\u00ebrheqjen e ushtar\u00ebve rus\u00eb t\u00eb dislokuar n\u00eb bregun e djatht\u00eb t\u00eb lumit Dniep\u00ebr, p\u00ebrfshi qytetin e Khersonit dhe nj\u00eb seri vendbanimesh t\u00eb vogla fshatrash. I transmetuar n\u00eb direkte televizive n\u00eb Rossija 24 por ka shum\u00eb mund\u00ebsi ishte filmuar …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":32031,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[42],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-32030","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-kulture"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/32030","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=32030"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/32030\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/32031"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=32030"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=32030"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=32030"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}