{"id":43216,"date":"2023-04-11T09:08:48","date_gmt":"2023-04-11T09:08:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/?p=43216"},"modified":"2023-04-11T09:11:59","modified_gmt":"2023-04-11T09:11:59","slug":"mossuksesi-i-forcave-te-armatosura-ruse","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/2023\/04\/11\/mossuksesi-i-forcave-te-armatosura-ruse\/","title":{"rendered":"Mossuksesi i forcave t\u00eb armatosura ruse"},"content":{"rendered":"

Forcat e armatosura ruse nuk kan\u00eb qen\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb arrijn\u00eb objektivat e tyre fillestare. Megjith\u00ebse element\u00ebt q\u00eb kan\u00eb shkaktuar mossuksesin e Mosk\u00ebs jan\u00eb t\u00eb ndrysh\u00ebm sipas kujt merr n\u00eb konsiderat\u00eb nivelin taktik, operativ dhe strategjik t\u00eb luft\u00ebs, gjith\u00ebsesi duket se ato tregojn\u00eb se nivelet drejtuese politiko \u2013 ushtarake ruse prisnin nj\u00eb fushat\u00eb me p\u00ebrmasa shum\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb kufizuara: instrumenti ushtarak i tyre nuk ishte gati t\u00eb drejtonte nj\u00eb operacion me k\u00ebt\u00eb shtrirje.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ofensiva ruse n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb tashm\u00eb e ka kaluar m\u00eb shum\u00eb se nj\u00eb vit. Megjith\u00ebse duket e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb t\u00eb analizohet ajo q\u00eb ndodh n\u00eb fush\u00ebn e betej\u00ebs kur ende luftohet \u2013 n\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, edhe sikur manipulimi i informacioneve t\u00eb p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsoj\u00eb nj\u00eb instrument t\u00eb dobish\u00ebm p\u00ebr ta goditur armikun \u2013 \u00ebsht\u00eb e mundur t\u00eb avancohen disa hipoteza lidhur me merit\u00ebn e ar\u00ebsyeve q\u00eb kan\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktuar suksesin e munguar t\u00eb ofensiv\u00ebs ruse n\u00eb vitin e par\u00eb t\u00eb luft\u00ebs.<\/p>\n

Pse lufta \u00ebsht\u00eb ende n\u00eb zhvillim? A nuk qen\u00eb forcat e armatosura ruse nj\u00eb instrument i mrekulluesh\u00ebm? Cil\u00ebt faktor\u00eb e shpjegojn\u00eb mossuksesin e rus\u00ebve? Nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e mundur t\u2019u jepet nj\u00eb p\u00ebrgjigje e vetme k\u00ebtyre pyetjeve. Sipas perspektiv\u00ebs q\u00eb adoptohet dhe nivelit t\u00eb analiz\u00ebs mbi t\u00eb cil\u00ebn vendoset fokusi, p\u00ebrgjigjet marrin p\u00ebrmbajtje tejet t\u00eb ndryshme. Ky artikull tentont\u00eb jap\u00eb disa hipoteza q\u00eb shpjegojn\u00eb mossuksesin e forcave ruse duke adoptuar nj\u00eb perspektiv\u00eb past\u00ebrtisht ushtarake dhe duke studiuar 3 nivele t\u00eb ndryshme analize: atij taktik, operativ dhe strategjik. Dallimi midis k\u00ebtyre 3 niveleve varet nga doktrina ushtarake q\u00eb merret si referim. Doktrina ushtarake italiane quan nivel taktik at\u00eb \u201cku aktivitetet, luftimet dhe betejat jan\u00eb t\u00eb planifikuara dhe kryhen me q\u00ebllim realizimin e objektivave ushtarak\u00eb t\u00eb caktuar nga formacionet dhe nj\u00ebsti taktike\u201d. Ai operativ \u00ebsht\u00eb \u201cniveli ku planifikohen, realizohen dhe mb\u00ebshtetet fushata dhe operacione me r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi t\u00eb madhe t\u00eb prirura nga arritja e objektivave strategjik\u00eb brenda tatrove apo zonave t\u00eb operacioneve\u201d. S\u00eb fundi, niveli strategjik p\u00ebrkufizohet si \u201cnivel ndaj t\u00eb cilit nj\u00eb vend apo grup vendesh p\u00ebrcaktojn\u00eb nj\u00eb seri objektivash sigurie komb\u00ebtare apo multikomb\u00ebtare dhe harxhojn\u00eb resurset e tyre komb\u00ebtare, p\u00ebrfshi ato ushtarake, p\u00ebr t\u2019i arritur\u201d. P\u00ebr ta thjeshtuar, mund t\u00eb dallohet niveli n\u00eb baz\u00eb t\u00eb llojit t\u00eb veprimit. N\u00eb nivel taktik, objekti i studimit jan\u00eb betejat; n\u00eb nivel operativ, studiohen operacionet e kryera nga nj\u00eb forc\u00eb e armatosur, n\u00eb nivel strategji studiohet strategjia, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb m\u00ebnyra me t\u00eb cil\u00ebn d\u00ebshirohet t\u00eb arrihet ajo q\u00eb doktrina e NATO e quan end state<\/em>, objektivi final.<\/p>\n

Niveli taktik<\/strong><\/p>\n

N\u00eb nivel taktik, d\u00ebshtimi rus ka tre shpjegime. I pari ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me doktrin\u00ebn e p\u00ebrdorimit. N\u00ebse ka nj\u00eb gj\u00eb q\u00eb v\u00ebzhguesit ushtarak\u00eb per\u00ebndimor\u00eb i kan\u00eb njohur p\u00ebr nj\u00eb koh\u00eb t\u00eb gjat\u00eb rus\u00ebve \u00ebsht\u00eb aft\u00ebsi p\u00ebr t\u00eb kryer operacione interarm\u00eb dhe interforc\u00eb duke manovruar me qindramij\u00ebra njer\u00ebz dhe mjete. N\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtim nga forcat per\u00ebndimore, q\u00eb prej 20 vjet\u00ebsh jan\u00eb specializuar n\u00eb luftime kund\u00ebr formacionesh rebele, ushtria ruse konsiderohej si forca e vetme europiane n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb kryente operacione t\u00eb m\u00ebdha tok\u00ebsore n\u00eb nj\u00eb skenar lufte konvencionale. N\u00eb thelb, rus\u00ebt konsideroheshin t\u00eb aft\u00eb t\u00eb manovronin n\u00eb nj\u00eb kontekst t\u00eb ngjash\u00ebm me at\u00eb a\u00eb karakterizon konfliktin n\u00eb zhvillim n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb. Me manov\u00ebr n\u00ebnkuptohet kombinimi i l\u00ebvizjes s\u00eb forcave dhe menaxhimit t\u00eb zjarrit me q\u00ebllim q\u00eb t\u00eb sigurohet nj\u00eb avantazh ndaj armikut: n\u00eb thelb, trupat l\u00ebvizin n\u00eb terren duke shfryt\u00ebzuar fuqin\u00eb e zjarrit e nxjerr\u00eb prej tyre apo nga mb\u00ebshtetjen e tyre. Nj\u00eb luft\u00eb manovre \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb e ndryshme, p\u00ebr shembull nga lufta e luftuar n\u00eb Libi m\u00eb 2011 \u2013 nuk kishte l\u00ebvizje t\u00eb trupave per\u00ebndimore n\u00eb terren, vet\u00ebm bombardime \u2013 apo ajo n\u00eb Afganistan midis vitit 2006 dhe 2014 \u2013 q\u00eb ka qen\u00eb mbi t\u00eb gjitha nj\u00eb kund\u00ebrguerrilje, ku objektivi ishte t\u00eb fitohej favori i popullsis\u00eb dhe jo t\u00eb eliminoheshin nj\u00ebsit\u00eb armike, aq m\u00eb pak t\u00eb pushtohej terren.<\/p>\n

Megjithat\u00eb, n\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtim me shpresat e Per\u00ebndimit, n\u00eb faz\u00ebn e par\u00eb t\u00eb fushat\u00ebs n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb rus\u00ebt duket se kan\u00eb preferuar nj\u00eb lloj tjet\u00ebr qasjeje. Gjat\u00eb jav\u00ebve t\u00eb para t\u00eb luft\u00ebs, nuk kemi asistuar n\u00eb manovra t\u00eb m\u00ebdha t\u00eb trupave t\u00eb korracuara n\u00eb nivel brigade apo divizioni, por n\u00eb luftime intensive urbane, t\u00eb shoq\u00ebruara nga dislokime masive artilerie. Rus\u00ebt nuk kan\u00eb manovruar si\u00e7 e prisnim, sidomos kan\u00eb p\u00ebrdorur si gur kryesor t\u00eb operacioneve t\u00eb tyre Battalion Tactical Group (BTG), dometh\u00ebn\u00eb formacione t\u00eb p\u00ebrkohsh\u00ebm, tejet fleksib\u00ebl \u2013 konsistenca numerike e t\u00eb cil\u00ebve varion p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsisht nga 800 n\u00eb 1000 nj\u00ebsi \u2013 t\u00eb ideuara p\u00ebr t\u00eb kryer nd\u00ebrhyrje t\u00eb kufizuara n\u00eb aspektin e fushatave m\u00eb t\u00eb vogla. BTG paraqiten keq po t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoren n\u00eb operacione masive kund\u00ebr kund\u00ebrshtar\u00ebve t\u00eb pajisur me kapacitete ushtarake moderne. N\u00eb nivel teorik, zgjidhja m\u00eb e p\u00ebrshtatshme do t\u00eb kishte qen\u00eb ajo e p\u00ebrshtatjes s\u00eb n\u00ebnndarjes m\u00eb klasike n\u00eb regjimente, brigada apo divizione, por ka shum\u00eb t\u00eb ngjar\u00eb q\u00eb rus\u00ebt nuk kishin njer\u00ebz mjaftuesh\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb \u201cmbushur\u201d t\u00eb gjitha pozicionet e nevojshme organike. Faktikisht, sipas analist\u00ebve m\u00eb ekspert\u00eb, ushtrua ruse ishte e strukturuar p\u00ebr nj\u00eb fushat\u00eb t\u00eb shpejt\u00eb e mblshtetur nga nj\u00eb p\u00ebrdorim masiv i artilieris\u00eb, jo p\u00ebr nj\u00eb ofensiv\u00eb t\u00eb zgjatur dhe n\u00eb shkall\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb si ajo q\u00eb u \u00ebsht\u00eb dashur t\u00eb kryejn\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Mungesa e personelit p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson shkakun kryesor t\u00eb problemit t\u00eb dyt\u00eb t\u00eb madh taktik to forcave ruse, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb munges\u00ebs s\u00eb k\u00ebmb\u00ebsoris\u00eb. Shpesh formacionet ruse qen\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrb\u00ebra nga nj\u00eb num\u00ebr i madh mjetesh t\u00eb korracuara t\u00eb shoq\u00ebruar nga mjete t\u00eb korracuara t\u00eb shoq\u00ebruara nga nj\u00eb num\u00ebr i pak\u00ebt nj\u00ebsish\u00eb k\u00ebmb\u00ebsore. B\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb problem q\u00eb rus\u00ebt e pat\u00ebn p\u00ebrjetuar n\u00eb Grozny n\u00eb vitin 1995. Formacionet e korracuara mund t\u00eb jen\u00eb t\u00eb pajisura me mjetet m\u00eb moderne, por n\u00ebse nuk jan\u00eb t\u00eb shoq\u00ebruara nga trupa k\u00ebmb\u00ebsore, mjetet jan\u00eb tejet t\u00eb c\u00ebnueshme. Kjo hipotez\u00eb mund t\u00eb shpjegoj\u00eb numrin e dendur t\u00eb tankeve ruse t\u00eb goditura nga raketat, minat antitanke dhe nga minat. Do t\u00eb shpjegonte edhe numrin e lart\u00eb e tankeve t\u00eb braktisura. Rus\u00ebt kan\u00eb provuar t\u2019i kompensojn\u00eb k\u00ebto probleme duke rekrutuar personel nga trupat e Marin\u00ebs, milicit\u00eb separatiste, nga mercenar\u00ebt e Wagner dhe nga Garda Komb\u00ebtare Ruse.<\/p>\n

S\u00eb fundi, cil\u00ebsia e pajisjeve ruse. P\u00ebrpara fillimit t\u00eb ofensiv\u00ebs, opinioni i p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt midis analist\u00ebve dhe ekspert\u00ebve q\u00eb merreshin me forcat e armatosura ruse ishte se instrumenti ushtarak i Mosk\u00ebs ishte b\u00ebr\u00eb tahsm\u00eb nj\u00eb arm\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb moderne dhe teknologjikisht m\u00eb e avancuar nga sa ishte par\u00eb tashm\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 20 vite m\u00eb par\u00eb n\u00eb \u00c7e\u00e7eni. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, thuhej se nga 2005 n\u00eb 2018, shpenzimi ushtarak ruse ishte m\u00eb shum\u00eb se dyfishuar, gj\u00eb q\u00eb kishte mund\u00ebsuar nj\u00eb modernizim t\u00eb konsideruesh\u00ebm t\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb aparatit ushtarak. Pas pak jav\u00ebsh nga fillimi i operacionit ishte tashm\u00eb e qart\u00eb se ky modernizim i shpalosur ishte n\u00eb realitet m\u00eb pak i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm nga sa mendohej. Dhjet\u00ebramij\u00ebra ushtar\u00eb ruse t\u00eb gjetur t\u00eb vdekur apo t\u00eb r\u00ebn\u00eb rob\u00ebr p\u00ebrdornin akoma material sovjetik, sidomos ata t\u00eb ardhur nga Distrikti Ushtarak Lindor. Shum\u00eb tanke, si T-72A\/AV, jan\u00eb demonstruar jasht\u00ebzakonisht problematik\u00eb n\u00eb fush\u00ebn e betej\u00ebs. Vet\u00ebm n\u00eb prill, humbjet e konfirmuara qen\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 500 nj\u00ebsi, m\u00eb shum\u00eb se gjysma krejt\u00ebsisht t\u00eb shkat\u00ebrruara. Mbrojtjet e tankeve shum\u00eb her\u00eb ose nuk qen\u00eb t\u00eb pranishme, ose qen\u00eb totalisht t\u00eb pap\u00ebrshtatshme p\u00ebr t\u2019i mbrojtur mjetet nga sistemet antitanke ukrainase. Komunikimet n\u00eb nivel taktik kan\u00eb rezultuar nj\u00eb dob\u00ebsi e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb, nj\u00eb faktor tashm\u00eb i v\u00ebrejtur n\u00eb Gjeorgji n\u00eb 2008. Edhe t\u00eb famshmit raketa kryq\u00ebzor\u00ebsh me rreze t\u00eb gjat\u00eb dhe municionet e drejtuara, aq t\u00eb l\u00ebvduara n\u00eb Siri, nuk kan\u00eb demonstruar nj\u00eb efikasitet t\u00eb madh. Vler\u00ebsohet se n\u00eb 2 muajt e par\u00eb t\u00eb luftimeve, Rusia ka l\u00ebshuar m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 1900 raketa me rreze t\u00eb shkurt\u00ebr dhe t\u00eb mesme, por se rreth 60% e tyre nuk ka funksionuar si\u00e7 pritej.<\/p>\n

Niveli operativ<\/strong><\/p>\n

N\u00eb nivel operativ, kan\u00eb qen\u00eb dy deficitet kryesore e forcave ruse. I pari ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me logjistik\u00ebn. Sipas disa analist\u00ebve, forcat ruse nuk kishin planifikuar mb\u00ebshtetjen logjistike p\u00ebr nj\u00eb plan B, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb sulm n\u00eb shkall\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb, por vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr nj\u00eb ofensiv\u00eb t\u00eb shkurt\u00ebr dhe t\u00eb shpejt\u00ebsi ajo q\u00eb ka karakterizuar faz\u00ebn e par\u00eb t\u00eb operacioneve. Ushtria ruse nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb dukur n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb furnizoj\u00eb n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb mjaftuesh\u00ebm t\u00eb shpejt\u00eb nj\u00ebsit\u00eb gjat\u00eb avancimit t\u00eb tyre. Mb\u00ebshtetja logjistike e nj\u00ebsive n\u00eb faz\u00eb sulmi rezulton jasht\u00ebzakonisht komplekse: linja logjistike zgjaet dit\u00eb pas dite, edhe me kilometra t\u00eb t\u00ebra, dhe furnizimi b\u00ebhet gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb; ve\u00e7 k\u00ebsaj, trupat n\u00eb avancim kan\u00eb nevoj\u00eb p\u00ebr sasira t\u00eb m\u00ebdha municonesh pasi duhet t\u00eb prodhojn\u00eb nj\u00eb v\u00ebllim t\u00eb madh zjarri. Deficitet logjistike duken se kan\u00eb qen\u00eb ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht t\u00eb r\u00ebnda n\u00eb sektorin per\u00ebndimor, ka mund\u00ebsi p\u00ebr shlal t\u00eb larg\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb madhe t\u00eb hekurudhave, q\u00eb impononte nj\u00eb p\u00ebrdorim intensiv kamion\u00ebsh.<\/p>\n

Deficiti i dyt\u00eb ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb n\u00eb fakt me p\u00ebrdorimin e aeronautik\u00ebs. Faktikisht rus\u00ebt kan\u00eb rezultuar t\u00eb paaft\u00eb t\u00eb sigurojn\u00eb dhe shfryt\u00ebzojn\u00eb supremacin\u00eb ajrore mbi Ukrain\u00eb, sidomos n\u00eb faz\u00ebn fillestare t\u00eb konfliktit. Shum\u00eb analist\u00eb prisnin operacione m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha n\u00eb dimensionin e tret\u00eb, p\u00ebr Forcat Aerohap\u00ebsinore t\u00eb Federat\u00ebs Ruse (VKS) kan\u00eb hezituar, duke shqyrtuar p\u00ebrdorimin e mjeteve, sidomos n\u00eb krahun fiks. Forcat e armatosura ruse kan\u00eb rezultuar t\u00eb paafta t\u00eb rr\u00ebmojn\u00eb dhe neutralizojn\u00eb mbrojtjet antiajrore ukrainase (t\u00eb dob\u00ebta). Rusia nuk ka qen\u00eb asnj\u00ebher\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje t\u2019i p\u00ebrdorin forcat e tyre ajrore n\u00eb territorin ukrainas pa rrezikuar q\u00eb mjetet e saj t\u00eb goditeshin nga postet ukrainase, sidomos n\u00eb lart\u00ebsit\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb ul\u00ebta. Atyre ju \u00ebsht\u00eb dashur t\u00eb kufizojn\u00eb p\u00ebrdorimin e VKS me dalje t\u00eb shpejta dhe lart\u00ebsi shum\u00eb t\u00eb larta, duke privilegjuar p\u00ebrdorimin n\u00eb lart\u00ebsit\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb ul\u00ebta n\u00eb or\u00ebt e nat\u00ebs.<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrdorimi i pak\u00ebt i VKS ka pasur pashmangshm\u00ebrisht pasoja negative mbi operacionet tok\u00ebsore. Faktikisht, deficiti i tret\u00eb n\u00eb nivel operativ konsiston pik\u00ebrisht n\u00eb koordinimin e munguar midis operacioneve ajrore dhe atyre tok\u00ebsore. V\u00ebzhguesit bien dakord n\u00eb konsiderimin se manovra tok\u00ebsore \u00ebsht\u00eb dukur shpesh krejt\u00ebsisht e palidhur nga operacionet n\u00eb dimensionin e tret\u00eb. Aktivitetet e kufizuara t\u00eb VKS jan\u00eb dukur t\u00eb finalizuara p\u00ebr t\u00eb goditur objektiva q\u00eb kishin t\u00eb b\u00ebnin pak me ato t\u00eb trupave n\u00eb terren.<\/p>\n

Nivel strategjik<\/strong><\/p>\n

N\u00eb nivel strategjik, kan\u00eb qen\u00eb tre midis deficiteve kryesore. I pari, d\u00ebshtimi i inteligjenc\u00ebs. Planifikimi rus duket se \u00ebsht\u00eb kryer me bindjen e thell\u00eb se forvaz ukrainase nuk do t\u00eb b\u00ebnin nj\u00eb rezistenc\u00eb t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme. N\u00eb konfirmim t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj hipoteze duket se \u00ebsht\u00eb mungesa e nj\u00eb plani t\u00eb v\u00ebrtet\u00eb p\u00ebr kryerjen e fushat\u00ebs. Pavar\u00ebsisht se Rusia kishte grumbulluar n\u00eb kufirin me Ukrain\u00ebn nj\u00eb sasi t\u00eb madhe force \u2013 dislokimi tejkalonte t\u00eb 100000 nj\u00ebsti\u00eb qysh n\u00eb fund t\u00eb janarit \u2013 n\u00eb faz\u00ebn fillestare t\u00eb fushat\u00ebs Moska \u00ebsht\u00eb dukur se ka synuar gjith\u00e7ka me iden\u00eb e nj\u00eb blici t\u00eb shpejt\u00eb mbi Kievin, t\u00eb realizuar n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet nj\u00eb komponentei t\u00eb kufizuar forcash t\u00eb leh\u00ebta. Me t\u00eb d\u00ebshtuar tentativa e blicit mbi Kievin, forcat ruse kan\u00eb kryer nj\u00eb avancim n\u00eb fronte t\u00eb shum\u00ebfishta, n\u00eb vend q\u00eb t\u00eb synonin kryeqytetin ukrainas, pa nj\u00eb fokusim t\u00eb qart\u00eb.<\/p>\n

I dyti, sulmi rus nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb paraprir\u00eb nga nj\u00eb fushat\u00eb shock and awe<\/em> t\u00eb tipit per\u00ebndimor. Ka pasur ndonj\u00eb sum kibernetik dhe ndonj\u00eb sulm me raketa balistike, por me shtrirje t\u00eb kufizuar. S\u00eb fundi, ka munguar figura e nj\u00eb komandanti t\u00eb p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm n\u00eb 6 jav\u00ebt e para t\u00eb luft\u00ebs. Moska ka mobilizuar forca nga 5 distrikte t\u00eb ndryshme, por nuk ka em\u00ebruar nj\u00eb komandant t\u00eb p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm. P\u00ebrkundrazi, nga ajo q\u00eb duket t\u00eb kuptohet, \u00e7do komandant distriktual i ka drejtuar trupat e tij n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb autonome. Vet\u00ebm n\u00eb jug, ku forcat ruse kan\u00eb arritur sukseset m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha, trupat qen\u00eb t\u00eb varura nga nj\u00eb komandant i vet\u00ebm, ai i Distriktit Ushtarak Jugor. Respektimi i parimit t\u00eb unitaritetit t\u00eb komand\u00ebs padshim q\u00eb i kan\u00eb dh\u00ebn\u00eb efikasitet m\u00eb t\u00eb madh aksionit t\u00eb formacioneve q\u00eb operonin n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb sektor. Gjith\u00ebsesi, analizat e problematikave kryesore, q\u00eb sot duket se kan\u00eb shkaktuar mossuksesin e forcave ruse \u2013 t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn n\u00eb fazat e para t\u00eb fushat\u00ebs \u2013 sugjeron se instrumenti ushtarak i Mosk\u00ebs nuk ishte gati t\u00eb kryente nj\u00eb ofensiv\u00eb t\u00eb k\u00ebtij lloji. Shum\u00eb prej problemeve t\u00eb hasura, si mungesa e personelit, mosefikasiteti i mb\u00ebshtetjes logjistike dhe mungesa e n\u00eb fushate shock and awe <\/em>fillestare, duken se sinjalizojn\u00eb se ideja baz\u00eb ishte ajo e kryerjes s\u00eb nj\u00eb operacioni t\u00eb shpejt\u00eb dhe t\u00eb kufizuar q\u00eb do ta rr\u00ebzonte regjimin ukrainas n\u00eb harkun e disa jav\u00ebve, n\u00eb mos t\u00eb disa dit\u00ebve. Mund\u00ebsia e t\u00eb dashurit n\u00eb fakt t\u00eb konfrontimit me nj\u00eb fishat\u00eb n\u00eb shkall\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb n\u00eb vendin m\u00eb t\u00eb madh t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs, kund\u00ebr nj\u00eb popullsie aq kok\u00ebfort\u00eb \u2013 dhe aq e mir\u00ebarmatosur nga Per\u00ebndimi \u2013 nuk duket se \u00ebsht\u00eb konsideruar me maturin\u00eb e duhur.<\/p>\n

(nga Geopoliticus<\/em>)<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n

ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Forcat e armatosura ruse nuk kan\u00eb qen\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb arrijn\u00eb objektivat e tyre fillestare. Megjith\u00ebse element\u00ebt q\u00eb kan\u00eb shkaktuar mossuksesin e Mosk\u00ebs jan\u00eb t\u00eb ndrysh\u00ebm sipas kujt merr n\u00eb konsiderat\u00eb nivelin taktik, operativ dhe strategjik t\u00eb luft\u00ebs, gjith\u00ebsesi duket se ato tregojn\u00eb se nivelet drejtuese politiko \u2013 ushtarake ruse prisnin nj\u00eb fushat\u00eb me p\u00ebrmasa …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":43218,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[42],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-43216","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-kulture"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/43216","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=43216"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/43216\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/43218"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=43216"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=43216"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=43216"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}