{"id":52429,"date":"2023-07-28T10:22:14","date_gmt":"2023-07-28T10:22:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/?p=52429"},"modified":"2023-07-28T10:22:14","modified_gmt":"2023-07-28T10:22:14","slug":"raporti-kompleks-midis-moskes-dhe-tel-avivit","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/2023\/07\/28\/raporti-kompleks-midis-moskes-dhe-tel-avivit\/","title":{"rendered":"Raporti kompleks midis Mosk\u00ebs dhe Tel Avivit"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Raportet diplomatike midis Mosk\u00ebs dhe Tel Avivit nuk kan\u00eb qen\u00eb asnj\u00ebher\u00eb t\u00eb thjeshta, por me shp\u00ebrb\u00ebrjen e Bashkimit Sovjetik, impostimi pragmatik i t\u00eb dyja vendeve ka favorizuar marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet reciproke. Konflikti sirian dhe paq\u00ebndrueshm\u00ebria nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare mbesin faktor\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm p\u00ebr ta kuptuar raportin ruso \u2013 izraelian.<\/p>\n<p>Megjith\u00ebse Bashkimi Sovjetik ka qen\u00eb nd\u00ebr vendet e para n\u00eb bot\u00eb q\u00eb e kan\u00eb njohur shtetin e Izraelit, i lindur n\u00eb p\u00ebrfundim t\u00eb mandatit anglez, nga ana e tij i ezauruar m\u00eb 14 maj\u00a0 t\u00eb 1948, gjat\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet midis Mosk\u00ebs dhe Tel Avivit nuk qen\u00eb sigurisht idiliake. Zgjedhja e fush\u00ebs s\u00eb shtetit hebraik, q\u00eb mbeti fuqimisht i ankoruar pas Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuarai duke u b\u00ebr\u00eb aleati kryesor i tyre n\u00eb rajon, nuk kontribuoi n\u00eb asnj\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb n\u00eb krijimin e nj\u00eb raporti t\u00eb q\u00ebndruesh\u00ebm me sovjetik\u00ebt. K\u00ebta t\u00eb fundit, q\u00eb megjithat\u00eb e kishin nj\u00eb rol jo dyt\u00ebsor r\u00ebnd\u00ebsie n\u00eb garantimin e mbijetes\u00ebs s\u00eb Izraelit, duke i dh\u00ebn\u00eb vendit levantin, n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet \u00c7ekosllovakis\u00eb, armamtimet e nevojshme p\u00ebr t\u2019u mbrojtur nga arab\u00ebt n\u00eb luft\u00ebn e 1948 \u2013 1949.<\/p>\n<p>Qe duke filluar nga viti 1953 q\u00eb u regjistrua ftohja e par\u00eb serioze e marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve diplomatike midis Mosk\u00ebs dhe Tel Avivit. P\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb nj\u00eb atentati q\u00eb \u00e7oi n\u00eb vdekjen e 3 qytetar\u00ebve sovjetik\u00eb, qeveria ruse, q\u00eb i konsideronte autoritetet izraeliane p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebs p\u00ebr \u00e7ka kishte ndodhur, vendosi ta nd\u00ebrpres\u00eb raportin me k\u00ebto t\u00eb fundit, p\u00ebrve\u00e7se p\u00ebr t\u2019u kthyer n\u00eb pas n\u00eb hapat e tyre disa muaj m\u00eb von\u00eb. Por n\u00eb vitin 1967, me shp\u00ebrthimin e Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Gjasht\u00eb Dit\u00ebve, marrdh\u00ebniet midis t\u00eb dy vendeve u prish\u00ebn p\u00ebrfundimisht. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, Bashkimi Sovjetik kishte punuar p\u00ebr t\u00eb krijuar nj\u00eb raport besimi me vendet islamike t\u00eb Lindjes s\u00eb Mesme me q\u00ebllim t\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtimit t\u00eb influenc\u00ebs amerikane n\u00eb rajon dhe, duke pasur parasysh zgjedhjen e Tel Aviv, nuk mund t\u00eb rreshtohej p\u00ebrve\u00e7se kund\u00ebr Izraelit. Puna e shtetit jebraik u kritikua ashp\u00ebr nga autoritetet sovjetike edhe gjat\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Yom Kippur (1973), asaj t\u00eb Libanit (1982) dhe t\u00eb nj\u00eb afrimi t\u00eb ndrojtur t\u00eb ndodhur vet\u00ebm n\u00eb p\u00ebrfundim t\u00eb viteve \u201980, me ardhjen e Gorba\u00e7iovit n\u00eb pushtet.<\/p>\n<p>Rikthimi n\u00eb normalitet, t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn p\u00ebr sa u p\u00ebrket marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve formale, ndodhi n\u00eb tetorin e vitit 1991, m\u00eb pak se 3 muaj nga shp\u00ebrb\u00ebrja e Bashkimit Sovjetik. M\u00eb pas, Tel Avivi e njohu menj\u00ebher\u00eb Federat\u00ebn Ruse si shtetin pasues t\u00eb Bashkimit Sovjetik, menj\u00ebher\u00eb sapo ky u shp\u00ebrb\u00eb, dhe gjat\u00eb viteve t\u00eb para t\u00eb epok\u00ebs Jelcin, kur politika e jashtme ishte fuqimisht n\u00eb duart e Kozyrev e t\u00eb oksidentalist\u00ebve, raporti me Mosk\u00ebn u b\u00eb dora dor\u00ebs m\u00eb i ngusht\u00eb. N\u00eb realitet, fazat e ndryshme t\u00eb kaluara nga Rusia n\u00eb 10 vitet e para nga r\u00ebnia e Bashkimit Sovjetik nuk do t\u2019i lejojn\u00eb Kremlinit t\u00eb vendos\u00eb nj\u00eb lidhje t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme me shtetin hebraik, sidomos po t\u00eb mbahet parasysh fakti se duke filluar nga mandati i dyt\u00eb i Jelcinit, i rizgjedhur \u00e7udit\u00ebrisht n\u00eb vitin 1996, dikasteri i Ministris\u00eb s\u00eb Jashtme u vendos n\u00ebn kontrollin e Jevgenij Primakov, q\u00eb m\u00eb pas do t\u00eb b\u00ebhej edhe kryeminist\u00ebr. Ai do t\u2019i jap\u00eb fund n\u00ebnshtrimit rus kundrejt Per\u00ebndimit dhe si njoh\u00ebs i kualifikuar i bot\u00ebs arabe, si\u00e7 edhe praktikisht ishte, do t\u00eb ndjek\u00eb n\u00eb zon\u00ebn e Lindjes s\u00eb Mesme nj\u00eb politik\u00eb multivektoriale jo kushedi sesa miq\u00ebsore kundrejt Izraelit.<\/p>\n<p>Gjith\u00ebsesi, n\u00eb vitet menj\u00ebher\u00eb pas shp\u00ebrb\u00ebrjes s\u00eb Bashkimit Sovjetik, Moska dhe Tel Avivi firmos\u00ebn marr\u00ebveshje t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme q\u00eb sanksionuan rifillimin e marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve diplomatike midis t\u00eb dy vendeve. N\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb ve\u00e7ant\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme t\u00eb n\u00ebnvizohet Traktati i Bashk\u00ebpunimit Ekonomik i vitit 1994, ai i Bashk\u00ebpunimit Tekniko \u2013 Shkencor gjithmon\u00eb i 1994 dhe, s\u00eb fundi, ai lidhur me Luft\u00ebn e P\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt kund\u00ebr Krimit t\u00eb Organizuar dhe Terrorizmit Nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar i 1997. Me ardhjen e Vladimir Putinit n\u00eb Presidenc\u00ebn e Federat\u00ebs Ruse n\u00eb vitin 1999, raporti midis Mosk\u00ebs dhe Tel Avivit u mbrujt me pragmatiz\u00ebn, duke par\u00eb se kultura strategjike t\u00eb dy vendeve i mund\u00ebsonte t\u00eb dy kancelarive nj\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00eb diskrete manovre n\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet reciproke. Megjith\u00ebse ekzistonin diferenca t\u00eb thella lidhur sidomos me impiantin e vlerave t\u00eb preferuar nga t\u00eb dy vendet, kishte edhe pika t\u00eb shumta t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebta q\u00eb u mund\u00ebsonin qeverine t\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunonin atje ku ekzistonin interesa t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebta.<\/p>\n<p>Kjo n\u00eb respektim t\u00eb plot\u00eb t\u00eb asaj <em>realpolitike<\/em> q\u00eb udh\u00ebhiqte politik\u00ebn e jashtme e t\u00eb dy vendeve. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, si Rusia, ashtu edhe Izraeli p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebsoheshin nga i ashtuquajturi \u201csindrom i rrethimit\u201d, gj\u00eb q\u00eb i \u00e7onte t\u00eb dyje vendet t\u00eb privilegjonin nj\u00eb kuptim miliarist t\u00eb pushtetit q\u00eb e vendoste sigurin\u00eb n\u00eb qend\u00ebr t\u00eb dinamikave politike. Kur n\u00eb loj\u00eb nuk ishin interesa t\u00eb kund\u00ebrta, Moska dhe Tel Avivi e shmangnin kritik\u00ebn e pun\u00ebs s\u00eb pal\u00ebs tjet\u00ebr dhe, kur detyroheshin t\u00eb pozicionoheshin, nuk ndiqnin asnj\u00eb veprim konkret ndaj fjal\u00ebve akuzuese.<\/p>\n<p>I \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb shembull i qart\u00eb pozicioni i marr\u00eb nga qeveria e udh\u00ebhequr nga Ariel Sharoni me rastin e Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Dyt\u00eb \u00c7e\u00e7ene, kur Izraeli abstenoi nga kritikimi i pun\u00ebs s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb rajonin e Kaukazit Verior, duke krijuar deri nj\u00eb paralele me situat\u00ebn e brendshme t\u00eb vendit, pre e luft\u00ebs s\u00eb detyruar nga Intifada e Dyt\u00eb. N\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn m\u00ebnyr\u00eb, megjith\u00ebse Moska nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb kursyer n\u00eb akuzimin e aksioneve t\u00eb Tel Avivit n\u00eb Cisjordani apo n\u00eb Rripin e Gaz\u00ebs, tonet e Kremlinit jan\u00eb dukur n\u00eb fakt gjithmon\u00eb t\u00eb buta. Nga ana tjet\u00ebr, Moska qe nj\u00eb prej aktor\u00ebve t\u00eb pak\u00ebt nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar\u00eb dhe sigurisht i vetmi i Kuartetit t\u00eb Madridit q\u00eb mbante marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie t\u00eb mira diplomatike me Hamasin. Kjo i ka mund\u00ebsuar Federat\u00ebs Ruse t\u00eb jet\u00eb e akredituar midis atyre q\u00eb mund t\u00eb luajn\u00eb nj\u00eb rol p\u00ebrcaktues n\u00eb zgjidhjen e konfliktit izraeliano \u2013 palestinez. Pozicioni zyrtar i Mosk\u00ebs respektivisht nj\u00eb konflikti t\u00eb till\u00eb pasqyron at\u00eb t\u00eb Kombeve t\u00eb Bashkuara dhe praktikisht Kremlini duket aktori i vet\u00ebm n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb dialogoj\u00eb me t\u00eb gjitha pal\u00ebt e p\u00ebrfshira: Autoritetin Palestinez, Izraelin dhe vet\u00eb Hamasin.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb se nj\u00eb rast qeveria ruse do t\u00eb ushtronte presione ndaj autoritetit t\u00eb Ramallahut dhe militant\u00ebve t\u00eb tij t\u00eb organizat\u00ebs islamiste q\u00eb t\u00eb vinte menjan\u00eb akreditimet q\u00eb e dallojn\u00eb gjithmon\u00eb raportin e tyre. N\u00eb syt\u00eb e Kremlinit, Palestina mund t\u00eb ekzistoj\u00eb vet\u00ebm n\u00ebse ndarjet e ndryshme midis falangave t\u00eb ndryshme politike t\u00eb ishin tejkaluar dhe n\u00eb negociatat me Izraelin t\u00eb mund t\u00eb merrnin pjes\u00eb edhe an\u00ebtar\u00ebt e Hamasit. N\u00eb shtojc\u00eb, politikat e administrat\u00ebs\u00a0 Trump, q\u00eb e kan\u00eb favorizuar fuqimisht Izraelin n\u00eb kurriz t\u00eb rival\u00ebve palestinez\u00eb, kan\u00eb kontribuar n\u00eb rritjen e influenc\u00ebs ruse mbi k\u00ebta t\u00eb fundit, duke i mund\u00ebsuar Kremlinit t\u00eb luaj\u00eb nj\u00eb rol m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm se ai q\u00eb do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb kishte pasur.<\/p>\n<p>Gjith\u00ebsesi, n\u00eb nivel social ekzistojn\u00eb lidhje t\u00eb konsiderueshme midis Federat\u00ebs Ruse dhe Izraelit, duke pasur parasysh se me shp\u00ebrb\u00ebrjen e Bashkimit Sovjetik 750000 qytetar\u00eb sovjetik\u00eb emigruan drejt shtetit hebraik. Kjo ka mund\u00ebsuar nj\u00eb afrim m\u00eb t\u00eb madh kulturor midis dy vendeve q\u00eb ka \u00e7uar n\u00eb nj\u00eb kuptim m\u00eb t\u00eb madh reciprok, pavar\u00ebsisht se duket m\u00eb e qart\u00eb sesi posedues t\u00eb shtet\u00ebsis\u00eb t\u00eb dyfisht\u00eb perceptohen kryesisht si izraelian\u00eb. P\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, sipas sondazheve, rreth 2\/3 e opinionit publik rus duket se posedojn\u00eb nj\u00eb vizion pozitiv t\u00eb shtetit hebraik, kuot\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb e lart\u00eb se ajo e vendeve per\u00ebndimore, ku m\u00eb pak se 40% e popullsis\u00eb mb\u00ebshtet Tel Avivin. P\u00ebr sa i p\u00ebrket q\u00ebndrimit ekonomik, marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet treg\u00ebtare midis Federat\u00ebs Ruse dhe Izraelit jan\u00eb rritur ndjesh\u00ebm n\u00eb vitet e fundit, megjith\u00ebse nuk p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsojn\u00eb edhe nj\u00eb kuot\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme t\u00eb PBB s\u00eb t\u00eb dy shteteve. Parashikueshm\u00ebrisht, Moska eksporton kryesisht resurse energjitike dhe importon pordukte bujq\u00ebsore.<\/p>\n<p>Faktikisht, Tel Avivi duket se ka p\u00ebrfituar nga impianti kund\u00ebrsaksionar i vendosur Federat\u00ebs nga vendet per\u00ebndimore p\u00ebr t\u2019ju p\u00ebrgjigjur masave ekonomike q\u00eb k\u00ebto vende kan\u00eb implementuar kundrejt tij me rastin e kriz\u00ebs ukrainase t\u00eb nisur m\u00eb 2014. N\u00eb dekad\u00ebn e fundit jan\u00eb firmosur pastaj marr\u00ebveshje t\u00eb shumta bashk\u00ebpunimi n\u00eb aspekte t\u00eb ndryshme, si ajo aerohap\u00ebsinore t\u00eb 2011, ajo lidhur me teknologjin\u00eb b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb 2013 dhe ajo q\u00eb ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me nanoteknologjit\u00eb e 2016. K\u00ebsaj i duhet shtuar q\u00ebllimi rus p\u00ebr t\u00eb marr\u00eb pjes\u00eb me konglomeratet e m\u00ebdha shtet\u00ebrore t\u00eb vetat n\u00eb shfryt\u00ebzimin e vendburimit t\u00eb gazit natyral <em>offshore<\/em> t\u00eb quajtur Leviathan. Ai gjendet thuajse t\u00ebr\u00ebsisht n\u00eb uj\u00ebrat territoriale izraeliane dhe mund t\u00eb rezultoj\u00eb nj\u00eb faktor i dobish\u00ebm n\u00eb zvog\u00eblimin e var\u00ebsis\u00eb europiane nga resurset energjitike ruse, at\u00ebhere kur t\u00eb implementohen projekti p\u00ebr nd\u00ebrtimin e nj\u00eb <em>pipeline<\/em> direkt drejt brigjeve greke. N\u00eb shum\u00eb raste Putini e ka treguar interesin e tij, duke pasur q\u00eb n\u00eb fund t\u00eb fund n\u00eb rast se Gazpromi t\u00eb merrte pjes\u00eb n\u00eb shfryt\u00ebzimin e vendburimit, Rusia do t\u00eb shikonte t\u2019i reduktohej rreziku i nj\u00eb pengimit t\u00eb pranis\u00eb s\u00eb saj n\u00eb tregun energjitik europian.<\/p>\n<p>Por <em>game-changer<\/em> i v\u00ebrtet\u00eb n\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet midis Mosk\u00ebs dhe Tel Avivit ka qen\u00eb pa fijen e dyshimit konflikti sirian. Duke ju p\u00ebrgjigjur pozitivisht k\u00ebrkes\u00ebs s\u00eb qeveris\u00eb s\u00eb Damaskut, aleat historik i Rusis\u00eb qysh nga\u00a0 epoka sovjetike, Kremlini filloi operacione ushtarake n\u00eb Siri m\u00eb 30 dhjetor t\u00eb 2015. Nd\u00ebrhyrja e Rusis\u00eb u p\u00ebrcaktua nga motivacione t\u00eb ndryshme, por u b\u00eb i mundur, midis gj\u00ebrave t\u00eb tjera, edhe nga \u00e7impenjimi i Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara nga rajoni i Lindjes s\u00eb Mesme i nisur nga administrata Obama dhe i vazhduar nga ato t\u00eb m\u00ebpasmet. Moska nuk donte t\u00eb linte t\u2019i shp\u00ebtonte mund\u00ebsia e mbushjes s\u00eb boshll\u00ebkut t\u00eb l\u00ebn\u00eb nga Uashingtoni q\u00eb megjithat\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb mir\u00eb t\u00eb kujtohet, mbetet aktori i jasht\u00ebm m\u00eb i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm p\u00ebr ekuilibrat rajonal\u00eb. Thuajse menj\u00ebher\u00eb u b\u00eb e nevojshme t\u00eb krijohej nj\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunim m\u00eb i thelluar me forcat e armatosura izraeliane me q\u00ebllim shmangien e incidenteveq\u00eb mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshinin ushtrit\u00eb respektive. Fakti q\u00eb Tel Avivi abstenoi nga d\u00ebnimi i aksioneve ruse n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb i b\u00ebri m\u00eb t\u00eb thjeshta gj\u00ebrat, n\u00eb momentin n\u00eb t\u00eb cilin Moska gjendej e izoluar n\u00eb nivel nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb vjesht\u00ebn e 2015 u krijua nj\u00eb \u201c<em>deconflicting mechanism<\/em>\u201d q\u00eb i mund\u00ebsonte Izraelit t\u00eb kryente sulme t\u00eb sh\u00ebnjestruara ndaj Hizballahut. Faktikisht, organizata shiite libaneze ishte aktive n\u00eb konfliktin civil sirian dhe luftonte n\u00eb krah t\u00eb ushtris\u00eb s\u00eb Damaskut, duke e mb\u00ebshtetur qeverin\u00eb e al Assad fal\u00eb edhe mbulimit t\u00eb forcave ajrore t\u00eb Federat\u00ebs Ruse. Autoritetet e Tel Avivit kishin nevoj\u00ebn e frenimit t\u00eb milicive t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetura nga Irani, sidomos n\u00eb zonat e Siris\u00eb q\u00eb kufizoheshin me shtetin hebraik. Duke par\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunimin e Mosk\u00ebs dhe Teheranit n\u00eb luftimin e opozitave t\u00eb qeveris\u00eb s\u00eb Damaskut, ishte absolutisht e nevojshme nj\u00eb shkall\u00eb e caktuar koordinimi me IDF, q\u00eb kishte objektiva krejt\u00ebsisht divergjente. Rr\u00ebzimi i gabuar i nj\u00eb IL-20 rus nga ana e kund\u00ebrajrores siriane n\u00eb vijim t\u00eb nj\u00eb sulmi izraelian, i verifikuar n\u00eb 2018, efektivisht ju akuzua Kremlinit nga qeveria e Tel Avivit, gj\u00eb q\u00eb krijoi nj\u00eb ftohje t\u00eb menj\u00ebhershme t\u00eb raporteve diplomatike. Kjo n\u00eb demonstrim t\u00eb nevoj\u00ebs, s\u00eb ndjer\u00eb nga t\u00eb dy aktor\u00ebt, p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbajtur t\u00eb hapur dhe funksionues nj\u00eb kanal komunikimi t\u00eb besuesh\u00ebm. N\u00eb vijim t\u00eb episodit kontradiktor, Moska k\u00ebrc\u00ebnoi se do t\u00eb furnizonte ushtrin\u00eb siriane me sistemin e mbrojtjes antiraketore S-300, q\u00eb do t\u2019ua b\u00ebnte jet\u00ebn e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb gjuajt\u00ebsve izraelian\u00eb. Vet\u00ebm fal\u00eb nj\u00eb takimi midis Putinit dhe Netanyahu fraktura u sh\u00ebrua.<\/p>\n<p>Takimi midis t\u00eb dy lider\u00ebve \u00e7oi n\u00eb nj\u00eb ndryshim marshi t\u00eb raportit midis t\u00eb dy vendeve, t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn p\u00ebr sa i p\u00ebrket skenarit sirian. Izraeli nuk protestoi p\u00ebr operacionet ushtarake t\u00eb ushtris\u00eb s\u00eb Damaskut n\u00eb af\u00ebrsit\u00eb e kufirit t\u00eb t\u00eb tij dhe, nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb, ndryshe nga sa kishte b\u00ebr\u00eb deri n\u00eb at\u00eb moment, Moska pranoi nevoj\u00ebn se t\u00eb gjith\u00eb aktor\u00ebt e jasht\u00ebm e pranish\u00ebm n\u00eb truallin sirian (dhe jo zyrtarisht t\u00eb ftuar nga qeveria) t\u00eb ktheheshin brenda territorit t\u00eb tyre. Ndryshimi i shpejt\u00eb i Kremlinit u p\u00ebrcaktua nga faktor\u00eb t\u00eb ndrysh\u00ebm. N\u00eb rast se Rusia kishte dashur gjithmon\u00eb t\u00eb mbante raporte t\u00eb mira me t\u00eb gjitha vendet e rajonit me q\u00ebllim rritjen e influenc\u00ebs s\u00eb saj, autoritetet e Mosk\u00ebs frik\u00ebsoheshin se nj\u00eb konflikt i hapur midis Izraelit dhe Iranit n\u00eb Siri do t\u00eb \u00e7onte n\u00eb nj\u00eb nd\u00ebrhyrje amerikane. At\u00ebhere kur nj\u00eb eventualitet i till\u00eb t\u00eb verifikohej, rus\u00ebt do t\u00eb rrezikonin t\u00eb humbisnin gjith\u00e7ka kishin fituar, n\u00eb nivel politik dhe ushtarak, nga nd\u00ebrhyrja e filluar m\u00eb 30 shtator 2015.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb shtojc\u00eb, me p\u00ebrfundimin e luftimeve, Irani dhe Rusia nis\u00ebn t\u00eb luftojn\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb kapur kontratat m\u00eb t\u00eb mira p\u00ebr rind\u00ebrtimin e Siris\u00eb. P\u00ebr t\u00eb mos folur pastaj p\u00ebr frik\u00ebn e Kremlinit se mos humbiste influenc\u00ebn ndaj Damaskut, natyrisht n\u00eb favor t\u00eb Teheranit. Kishte pra nj\u00eb konvergjenc\u00eb t\u00eb konsiderueshme t\u00eb interesave midis Mosk\u00ebs dhe Tel Avivit n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb aspekt. Por ishte m\u00eb shum\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme q\u00eb Federata t\u00eb arrinte t\u00eb mbante nj\u00eb pozicion t\u00eb ekuilibruar pasi sikur forcat e mb\u00ebshtetura nga Irani praktikisht t\u00eb qen\u00eb t\u00ebrhequr p\u00ebrpara fundit t\u00eb luft\u00ebs, Rusia do t\u00eb ishte e detyruar t\u2019i t\u00ebrhiqte ushtar\u00ebt e saj. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb rast problemi ishte q\u00eb opinioni publik rus nuk do ta pranonte kurr\u00eb nj\u00eb impenjim t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj natyre, duke qen\u00eb i b\u00ebr\u00eb alergjik, pas luft\u00ebrave \u00e7e\u00e7ene, p\u00ebr humbjen e jet\u00ebve njer\u00ebzore t\u00eb gjeneruar nga nj\u00eb konflikt.<\/p>\n<p>Pra ideja e Mosk\u00ebs do t\u00eb ishte ajo e krijimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb zone kushinet\u00eb, p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb kufirit midis Siris\u00eb dhe Izraelit, e thell\u00eb nja 100 kilometra brenda s\u00eb cil\u00ebs vet\u00ebm ushtria siriane do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb operonte. Duke e mbajtur k\u00ebshtu Hizballahun dhe milicit\u00eb e tjera t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetura nga Irani n\u00eb distanc\u00eb t\u00eb duhur nga shteti hebraik. Por Tel Avivi nuk e ka pranuar nj\u00eb zgjidhje t\u00eb till\u00eb. Duket interesante t\u00eb v\u00ebrehet sesi, p\u00ebrve\u00e7\u00a0 \u00e7\u00ebshtjeve past\u00ebrtisht strategjike, Rusia e konsideron Izraelin nj\u00eb ur\u00eb drejt Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara, me t\u00eb cilat p\u00ebr momentin marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet jan\u00eb shum\u00eb komplekse. N\u00eb vitin 2021, ardhja e administrat\u00ebs s\u00eb drejtuar nga Joe Biden n\u00eb Uashington dhe situata politike e paq\u00ebndrueshme e Izraelit i kan\u00eb komplikuar m\u00eb tej gj\u00ebrat. Qeveria e re amerikane nuk e ka b\u00ebr\u00eb kurr\u00eb mister se e konsideron Mosk\u00ebn nj\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim dhe nuk duket e synuar t\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunoj\u00eb me Kremlinin, n\u00eb ndryshim nga sa, t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn nominalisht, ishte deklaruar shum\u00eb her\u00eb nga Donald Trump. Tel Avivi, q\u00eb nuk mund (dhe nuk d\u00ebshiron) t\u00eb heq\u00eb dor\u00eb nga aleanca historike me Uashingtonin, mund t\u00eb gjendet n\u00eb siklet serioz n\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunimin me Mosk\u00ebn. Sidomos n\u00ebse tensionet midis Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara dhe Rusis\u00eb do t\u00eb p\u00ebrkeq\u00ebsoheshin m\u00eb tej. Nga ana tjet\u00ebr, pasiguria respektivisht t\u00eb ardhmes politike t\u00eb Izraelit ngre dyshime t\u00eb ngjashme lidhur me vazhdimin e bashk\u00ebpunimit me Federat\u00ebn.<\/p>\n<p>Rifillimi i fundit i luftimeve midis IDF dhe milicive palestineze, q\u00eb ka \u00e7uar n\u00eb vrasjen e civil\u00ebve t\u00eb shumt\u00eb n\u00eb Cisjordani dhe p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb Rripit t\u00eb Gaz\u00ebs, nuk ka shkaktuar indinjat\u00ebn e autoriteteve t\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs. N\u00eb respektimin e plot\u00eb t\u00eb pragmatizmit q\u00eb ka dalluar marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet ruso \u2013 izraeliane nga momenti i shp\u00ebrb\u00ebrjes s\u00eb Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe duke mbajtur parasysh raportin historik q\u00eb lidh Kremlinin me Autoritetin Palestinez dhe militant\u00ebt e Hamasit, qeveria ruse ka mbajtur nj\u00eb q\u00ebndrim neutral. Federata \u00ebsht\u00eb kufizuar t\u00eb d\u00ebnoj\u00eb dhun\u00ebn ndaj civil\u00ebve dhe i ka b\u00ebr\u00eb apel nevoj\u00ebs s\u00eb rifillimit sa m\u00eb shpejt t\u00eb jet\u00eb e mundur e negociatave. Nga ana tjet\u00ebr, duke par\u00eb interesat n\u00eb loj\u00eb, duket tejet e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb t\u00eb mendohet se Moska, tashm\u00eb e privuar nga korniza ideologjike q\u00eb e kishte dalluar epok\u00ebn sovjetike, mund t\u00eb shk\u00ebputet nga nj\u00eb pozicion q\u00eb i mund\u00ebson t\u00eb jet\u00eb, m\u00eb s\u00eb fundi, nj\u00eb aktore e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme n\u00eb rajonin e Lindjes s\u00eb Mesme.<\/p>\n<p>(nga <em>Geopoliticus<\/em>)<\/p>\n<p><strong>P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Raportet diplomatike midis Mosk\u00ebs dhe Tel Avivit nuk kan\u00eb qen\u00eb asnj\u00ebher\u00eb t\u00eb thjeshta, por me shp\u00ebrb\u00ebrjen e Bashkimit Sovjetik, impostimi pragmatik i t\u00eb dyja vendeve ka favorizuar marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet reciproke. Konflikti sirian dhe paq\u00ebndrueshm\u00ebria nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare mbesin faktor\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm p\u00ebr ta kuptuar raportin ruso \u2013 izraelian. Megjith\u00ebse Bashkimi Sovjetik ka qen\u00eb nd\u00ebr vendet e para n\u00eb &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":52430,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[42],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-52429","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-kulture"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/52429","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=52429"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/52429\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/52430"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=52429"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=52429"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=52429"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}