{"id":6024,"date":"2022-03-03T10:29:11","date_gmt":"2022-03-03T10:29:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/?p=6024"},"modified":"2022-03-03T10:29:11","modified_gmt":"2022-03-03T10:29:11","slug":"jo-te-gjitha-vendet-mund-te-aderojne-ne-paktin-atlantik","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/2022\/03\/03\/jo-te-gjitha-vendet-mund-te-aderojne-ne-paktin-atlantik\/","title":{"rendered":"Jo t\u00eb gjitha vendet mund t\u00eb aderojn\u00eb n\u00eb Paktin Atlantik"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>E kishte gabim Obama kur e deklasonte Rusin\u00eb n\u00eb fuqi rajonale. Ama kishte t\u00eb drejt\u00eb. Kur Eurazia do t\u00eb z\u00ebvend\u00ebsoj\u00eb Europ\u00ebn, Moska do t\u00eb jet\u00eb gati? P\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsia p\u00ebr konfliktin n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb krejt\u00ebsisht i NATO. Ka ardhur koha t\u00eb ndalet ekspansioni i saj.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb marsin e 2014, nj\u00eb jav\u00eb pasi Krimeja u shpall zyrtarisht pjes\u00eb e Rusis\u00eb, presidenti i Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara Barack Obama deklaroi se Moska kishte dh\u00ebn\u00eb prov\u00eb dob\u00ebsie. Si u mb\u00ebshtet ne samitin mbi sigurin\u00eb b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb Hag\u00ebs, sipas mendimit t\u00eb tij Rusia nuk ishte ve\u00e7se nj\u00eb fuqi rajonale. \u00abRusia \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb fuqi rajonale q\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnon disa prej fqinj\u00ebve t\u00eb saj t\u00eb af\u00ebrt jo p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb forc\u00ebs, por t\u00eb dob\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb saj\u00bb, tha presidenti amerikan. Uashingtoni ushtron nj\u00eb influenc\u00eb ndaj fqinj\u00ebve t\u00eb tij, por \u00abn\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsi nuk ka nevoj\u00eb t\u2019i pushtoj\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb ket\u00eb nj\u00eb raport t\u00eb ngusht\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunimi me ta\u00bb. P\u00ebr q\u00ebllime kandisjeje, Obama afirmoi edhe se aksionet ndaj Rusis\u00eb \u00abnuk p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsojn\u00eb rrezikun num\u00ebr nj\u00eb p\u00ebr Shtetet e Bashkuara. Mbetem m\u00eb i ppreokupuar p\u00ebr ndonj\u00eb shp\u00ebrthim eventual b\u00ebrthamor n\u00eb Manhattan\u00bb.<\/p>\n<p>Ky pohim pati nj\u00eb jehon\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb dhe n\u00eb fakt heterogjene. N\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara shum\u00eb e akuzuan Obam\u00ebn se nuk e kapi situat\u00ebn reale strategjike dhe r\u00ebnd\u00ebsin\u00eb e faktorit forc\u00eb apo t\u00eb shtirej se nuk i kuptonte k\u00ebto aspekte. N\u00eb Rusi reagimi kryesor qe ofendimi: si guxon t\u00eb degradoj\u00eb nj\u00eb superfuqi atomike n\u00eb statusin e nj\u00eb fuqie rajonale? Dhe sidomos si guxon ta b\u00ebj\u00eb tani, pasi ajo ka b\u00ebr\u00eb nj\u00eb hap vendimtar, n\u00eb demonstrim t\u00eb aft\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb tij p\u00ebr\u00a0 t\u00eb vepruar? Do t\u00eb jet\u00eb p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb motiv q\u00eb Obama, pavar\u00ebsisht personalitetit t\u00eb\u00a0 tij n\u00eb bot\u00eb, n\u00eb Rusi \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb prej president\u00ebve amerikan\u00eb m\u00eb pak t\u00eb dashur dhe t\u00eb respektuar. N\u00eb \u00e7do rast, Obama preku nj\u00eb nerv t\u00eb hapur.<\/p>\n<p>Mund ta sintetizojm\u00eb k\u00ebshtu lajtmotivin e politik\u00ebs s\u00eb jashtme ruse e 20 \u2013 25 viteve t\u00eb fundit, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb qysh kur Federata Ruse \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb nj\u00eb subjekt nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar: Moska synon q\u00eb t\u00eb kthehet t\u00eb jet\u00eb nj\u00eb prej aktor\u00ebve dometh\u00ebn\u00ebs t\u00eb skenarin gjeopolitik. P\u00ebr sa e habitshme mund t\u00eb duket, objektivi nuk ka ndryshuar \u00a0gjat\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb periudh\u00ebs, megjith\u00ebse Rusia dhe lider\u00ebt e saj mish\u00ebrojn\u00eb fenomene t\u00eb ndryshme n\u00eb koh\u00eb. P\u00ebr shembull, Rusia e 1995, ajo e 2005 dhe e 2015 jan\u00eb vende krejt\u00ebsisht t\u00eb ndryshme nj\u00ebri nga tjetri, por edhe parimet q\u00eb u p\u00ebrmbaheshin lider\u00ebt e saj diferencohen thell\u00ebsisht. Jo vet\u00ebm Jelcini qe ndryshe nga Putini, por edhe vet\u00eb Putini i mesit t\u00eb viteve \u20182000 dallohet nga Putini i mesit t\u00eb viteve \u201810. Por t\u00eb gjitha k\u00ebto diferenca nuk duhet t\u00eb kapen pas nj\u00eb fakti: kan\u00eb ndryshuar idet\u00eb lidhur me mjetet e prirura p\u00ebr ta arritur objektivin, por jo ky i fundit. Jelcini mendonte se vendi q\u00eb Rusia meritonte t\u00eb zinte n\u00eb aren\u00ebn nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare mund t\u00eb rifitohej duke bashk\u00ebpunuar me vendet lidere n\u00eb nivel bot\u00ebror dhe duke marr\u00eb pjes\u00eb aktivisht n\u00eb organizatat nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme. N\u00eb fillimet e presidenc\u00ebs s\u00eb tij, Putini vazhdoi energjikisht t\u00eb avanconte qasjen e paraardh\u00ebsit t\u00eb tij, por e kuptoi se partner\u00ebt per\u00ebndimor\u00eb nuk qen\u00eb t\u00eb interesuar p\u00ebr nj\u00eb rikthim t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb rangun e fuqis\u00eb s\u00eb madhe.<\/p>\n<p>Qe pik\u00ebrisht Putini ai q\u00eb formuloi n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb jasht\u00ebzakonisht konkrete \u00e7\u00ebshtjen e rivendosjes s\u00eb statusit t\u00eb vendit si objektiv kryesor i Rusis\u00eb dhe e b\u00ebri qysh nga fillimi. Artikulli i tij \u00abRusia n\u00eb kap\u00ebrcyellin e mij\u00ebvje\u00e7ar\u00ebve\u00bb, i botuar nj\u00eb dit\u00eb p\u00ebrpara se t\u00eb b\u00ebhej president <em>ad interim<\/em> m\u00eb 31 dhjetor 1999, konkludonte k\u00ebshtu: \u00abNdoshta p\u00ebr her\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb n\u00eb 200 \u2013 300 vjet (Rusia) gjendet ball\u00eb p\u00ebr ball\u00eb me rrezikun real e gjetjes n\u00eb kompartimentin e dyt\u00eb, n\u00eb mos t\u00eb tret\u00eb, t\u00eb shteteve t\u00eb bot\u00ebs. Q\u00eb kjo t\u00eb mos ndodh\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb e nevojshme nj\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekje e madhe e t\u00eb gjitha forcave intelektuale, fizike dhe morale t\u00eb vendit. Duhet nj\u00eb pun\u00eb konstruktive dhe e koordinuar. Askush nuk do ta b\u00ebj\u00eb p\u00ebr ne n\u00eb vendin ton\u00eb\u00bb.<\/p>\n<p>Politika e jashtme ruse midis 2007 dhe 2015 p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson nj\u00eb l\u00ebshim drejt realizimit t\u00eb objektivit t\u00eb formuluar nga Putini, pasi q\u00eb rruga e bashk\u00ebpunimit nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar u njoh si nj\u00eb rreth vicioz. Kjo politik\u00eb mbledh gjykime t\u00eb ndryshme, por askush nuk e v\u00eb n\u00eb dyshim faktin q\u00eb Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb kthyer midis vendeve q\u00eb ushtrojn\u00eb influenc\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe n\u00eb bot\u00eb. Ajo q\u00eb e d\u00ebshmon nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb Ukraina e 2014, por Siria e 2015: p\u00ebr her\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb nga koha e Bashkimit Sovjetik, Moska \u00ebsht\u00eb transformuar n\u00eb nj\u00eb aktor ky\u00e7 n\u00eb nj\u00eb konflikt jorajonal apo passovjetik, por global, ku merrninin pjes\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha fuqit\u00eb kryesore bot\u00ebrore. Mund t\u00eb thuhet se n\u00eb at\u00eb moment detyrimi q\u00eb Putini kishte marr\u00eb n\u00eb 1999 u respektua. Kjo ka p\u00ebrcaktuar hapjen e nj\u00eb axhende t\u00eb re gjeopolitike, po qe e mundur edhe m\u00eb komplekse.<\/p>\n<p>Por le t\u00eb kthehemii tek deklarata e Obam\u00ebs p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb si fuqi rajonale. N\u00eb nj\u00eb far\u00eb kuptimi, presidenti amerikan kishte t\u00eb drejt\u00eb, megjith\u00ebse synonte t\u00eb thoshte di\u00e7ka krejt tjet\u00ebr. Obama donte t\u00eb ridimensiononte pesh\u00ebn e Mosk\u00ebs, nd\u00ebrsa nuk ka b\u00ebr\u00eb tjet\u00ebr ve\u00e7se ka n\u00ebnvizuar kriterin e duhur q\u00eb takin p\u00ebrcakton influenc\u00ebn e nj\u00eb vendi n\u00eb skenarin nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar. Epok\u00ebs s\u00eb superfuqive po i vjen fundi dhe jo se pse Shtetet e Bashkuara apo Kina po dob\u00ebsohet, por p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb ndryshimit t\u00eb struktur\u00ebs s\u00eb politik\u00ebs dhe t\u00eb ekonomis\u00eb bot\u00ebrore. K\u00ebto jan\u00eb diversifikuar gjithmon\u00eb, m\u00eb pak universale; niveli rajonal tan\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktues. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb kuptim, mund t\u00eb afirmohet se statusi i Rusis\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb ai i fuqis\u00eb rajonale n\u00ebnkupton ta n\u00ebnvizoj\u00eb pesh\u00ebn e saj, aq m\u00eb shum\u00eb q\u00eb n\u00eb virtyt t\u00eb nj\u00eb serie parametrash objektive, Moska posedon edhe instrumenta t\u00eb ndryshme influence globale (karrigen e p\u00ebrhershme n\u00eb K\u00ebshillin e Sigurimit t\u00eb OKB, arm\u00eb atomike, nj\u00eb potencial ushtarak dometh\u00ebn\u00ebs, resurse natyrale t\u00eb m\u00ebdha).<\/p>\n<p>Duhet marr\u00eb n\u00eb konsiderat\u00eb pastaj se n\u00eb \u00e7far\u00eb rajoni specifik ndodhet Rusia n\u00eb cil\u00ebsin\u00eb e fuqis\u00eb s\u00eb madhe: Eurazis\u00eb, rajon q\u00eb historikisht ka p\u00ebrcaktuar ecurin\u00eb e gjeopolitik\u00ebs globale dhe q\u00eb do ta b\u00ebj\u00eb akoma m\u00eb shum\u00eb n\u00eb dekadat e ardhshme, dora dor\u00ebs q\u00eb bariqendra gjeopolitike e s\u00eb cil\u00ebs do t\u00eb spostohet nga Europa n\u00eb Azi. Prandaj, statusi i fuqis\u00eb rajonale nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb aspak posht\u00ebrues p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb, sa avantazhues dhe komod. Nj\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtje q\u00eb megjithaat\u00eb del tani dhe q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb me r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi jetime p\u00ebr stabilitetin rajonal n\u00eb vitet e ardhsme n\u00ebse Rusia do t\u00eb konfirmohet si fuqi rajonale dhe n\u00ebse do t\u00eb njiihet si e till\u00eb nga aktor\u00ebt kryesor\u00eb, n\u00eb radh\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb nga ata per\u00ebndimor\u00eb. Tema \u00ebsht\u00eb direkt e lidhur me rezultatet e 30 vje\u00e7arit t\u00eb kaluar nga kolapsi i Bashkimit Sovjetik.<\/p>\n<p>Vjeshta 2021 (vigjilje e p\u00ebrvjetorit t\u00eb zhdukjes s\u00eb Bashkimit Sovjetik) \u00ebsht\u00eb shoq\u00ebruar gjithmon\u00eb nga preokupimi n\u00eb rritje rretj stabilitetit t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs Lindore. Teatri i p\u00ebrplasjes midis Rusis\u00eb dhe Ukrain\u00ebs, por edhe i kund\u00ebrv\u00ebnies midis Bjellorusis\u00eb dhe Polonis\u00eb. N\u00ebse ky i fundit varet direkt, p\u00ebr shum\u00eb aspekte, nga lideri bjellorus, i pari \u00ebsht\u00eb me natyr\u00eb strukturore. Situata e raporteve ruso \u2013 ukrainase (ose n\u00eb fakt ruso \u2013 amerikane n\u00eb referim me \u00e7\u00ebshtjen ukrainase) mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsoj\u00eb nj\u00eb moment historik t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm n\u00eb rrug\u00ebtimin\u00a0 europian pas Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb. Mbi baz\u00ebn e k\u00ebsaj krize do t\u00eb diskutohet mbi ruajtjen apo asgj\u00ebsimin e themeleve mbi t\u00eb cilin \u00ebsht\u00eb nd\u00ebrtuar gjeopolitika n\u00eb Europ\u00eb pas ribashkimit gjerman, pik\u00ebnisje e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb pasi pik\u00ebrisht me vendimin e Gjermanis\u00eb s\u00eb bashkuar p\u00ebr t\u00eb aderuar n\u00eb NATO nisi \u00e7montimi konkret i sistemit t\u00eb m\u00ebparsh\u00ebm t\u00eb siguris\u00eb europiane.<\/p>\n<p>Tani nuk ka m\u00eb kuptim t\u00eb pyeten n\u00ebse kishte alternativa t\u00eb mundshme. Gj\u00ebja m\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme \u00ebsht\u00eb\u00a0 se postulati relativ me t\u00eb drejt\u00ebn e \u00e7do vendi p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjedhur t\u00eb aderoj\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb aleanc\u00eb politiko \u2013 ushtarake (ose m\u00eb qart\u00eb, ta zgjedh\u00eb si\u00e7 do sigurin\u00eb e tij), e sanksionuar nga Karta e Parisit p\u00ebr nj\u00eb Europ\u00eb t\u00eb re, \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb themelore qysh at\u00ebhere. Prapa fjal\u00ebve t\u00eb Kart\u00ebs fshihej dashakeq\u00ebsia: duke filluar nga 1991 \u00ebsht\u00eb e mundur t\u00eb aderohet n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb unike n\u00eb Paktin Atlantik, p\u00ebrderisa aleanca t\u00eb tjera n\u00eb Europ\u00eb nuk ka m\u00eb. Bashkimi Sovjetik, q\u00eb mund\u00ebsoi aderimin n\u00eb NATO t\u00eb Gjermanis\u00eb s\u00eb bashkuar, me k\u00ebt\u00eb n\u00eb fakt imponoi zhvillimet e ardhshme t\u00eb siguris\u00eb europiane. P\u00ebr sa i p\u00ebrket Rusis\u00eb q\u00eb ankohej m\u00eb pas, p\u00ebrgjigja ishte gjithmon\u00eb e nj\u00ebjta: keni qen\u00eb vet\u00eb ju q\u00eb e keni mund\u00ebsuar!<\/p>\n<p>Q\u00eb vet\u00eb NATO ka r\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb kurth \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb e qart\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb von\u00eb. Zgjerimi automatik dhe, si\u00e7 mendohej, i privuar nga problemet e Paktatit Atlantik qe nj\u00eb nd\u00ebrmarrje gjeopolitiko \u2013 ideologjike, nd\u00ebrsa aspekti ushtarak luante nj\u00eb rol dyt\u00ebsor. Kjo vlen si p\u00ebr qasjen konkrete e vendeve t\u00eb reja an\u00ebtare ndaj gadishm\u00ebris\u00eb operative s\u00eb bllokur, prej zellit me t\u00eb cilin Aleanca synon q\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebr\u00eb eventualisht n\u00eb praktik\u00eb Nenin e 5, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb mbrojtjen reciproke midis t\u00eb gjith\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00ebve. N\u00eb nivel formal, gj\u00ebja pranohet, por \u00ebsht\u00eb e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb q\u00eb Uashingtoni apo kryeqytetet e tjera europiane kan\u00eb synuar ndonj\u00ebher\u00eb t\u00eb hyjn\u00eb n\u00eb luft\u00eb me Rusin\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbrojtur Letonin\u00eb apo Sllovakin\u00eb. Nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb konsideruar kurr\u00eb nj\u00eb skenar i mundsh\u00ebm. Nga nj\u00ebra an\u00eb, ventiloheshin ide t\u00eb mjegullta lidhur me aderimin e mundsh\u00ebm t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb ndonj\u00eb struktur\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt sigurie. Si\u00e7 duhej t\u00eb konfigurohej n\u00eb praktik\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb struktur\u00eb eventuale nuk e imagjinonte askush; gjith\u00e7ka ishte e kufizuar n\u00eb reflektime abstrakte, nd\u00ebrsa n\u00eb sfondin e NATO mir\u00ebpriste gjithmon\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00eb t\u00eb rinj.<\/p>\n<p>Federata Ruse n\u00eb dekad\u00ebn e par\u00eb t\u00eb ekzistenc\u00ebs ishte aq e varur nga partner\u00ebt e huaj sa t\u00eb bind\u00ebte k\u00ebdo q\u00eb, edhe pse nj\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim i till\u00eb nuk lindi kurr\u00eb, do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb\u00a0 zbutej me metoda paq\u00ebsore. Rivendosja e vet\u00ebmjaftueshm\u00ebris\u00eb s\u00eb vendit do t\u00eb k\u00ebrkonte koh\u00eb. Duke pasur parasysh premisat, \u00e7do tentativ\u00eb ruse p\u00ebr t\u00eb konkorduar garancit\u00eb juridike n\u00eb fush\u00ebn e siguris\u00eb ishte i kufizuar a priori n\u00eb arritjen e saj. Rusia mund t\u00eb protestonte, pyeste, por \u00e7do propozim i saj \u2013 i past\u00ebr ose jo q\u00eb t\u00eb ishte \u2013 presupozonte nj\u00eb konfrontim t\u00eb barabart\u00eb, q\u00eb Aleanca Atlantike, e m\u00ebsuar q\u00eb t\u00eb \u00e7onte deri n\u00eb fund ar\u00ebsyet e saj, nuk ishte e gatshme q\u00eb t\u2019i merrte. Anasjelltas, p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb q\u00ebndrimi i NATO ishte i papranuesh\u00ebm.<\/p>\n<p>Pakti Atlantik mund t\u2019i konsideroj\u00eb ose jo interesat e t\u00eb tjer\u00ebve, por nuk do t\u2019i vendos\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjtin plan me t\u00eb tijat. Midis viteve \u201990 dhe \u201910 t\u00eb mij\u00ebvje\u00e7arit t\u00eb ri, riting\u00ebllonte si nj\u00eb mant\u00ebr supozimi se askush nuk mund t\u00eb kishte t\u00eb drejt\u00eb vetoje mbi marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet e NATO me an\u00ebtar\u00ebt aspirues. Natyrisht, faktikisht rregulli kishte edhe p\u00ebrjashtime. Le t\u00eb merret samiti i Bukureshtit t\u00eb Aleanc\u00ebs Atlantike NATO i mbajtur n\u00eb 2008: at\u00ebhere Gjermania dhe Franca e refuzuan presionin e Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuar n\u00eb favor t\u00eb miratimit t\u00eb Membership Action Plan (MAP) p\u00ebr Gjeorgjin\u00eb dhe Ukrain\u00ebn, pasi i frik\u00ebsoheshin hakmarrjes s\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs; u arrit nj\u00eb kompromis, q\u00eb e shtyu situat\u00ebn drejt nj\u00eb rrethi vicioz, p\u00ebrderisa MAP p\u00ebr k\u00ebto dy vende nuk kaloi, por n\u00eb dokumentin final u deklarua se nj\u00eb dit\u00eb ato t\u00eb ishin pjes\u00eb e Aleanc\u00ebs. \u00cbsht\u00eb shkruar n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb qart\u00eb dhe pa asnj\u00eb rezerv\u00eb. N\u00eb nivel diplomatik Kremlini u sigurua se b\u00ebhej fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb deklarim t\u00eb thjesht\u00eb: askush nuk do ta pranonte aderimin e k\u00ebtyre dy vendeve, ishte nj\u00eb formalitet i thjesht\u00eb, e kuptonin situat\u00ebn dhe k\u00ebshtu me radh\u00eb. Megjithat\u00eb, ky ambiguitet themelor i njohur n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb thuajse zyrtare p\u00ebrbalti marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet politiko \u2013 ushtarake dhe diplomatike, duke fshir\u00eb bazat e besimit. Gjith\u00e7ka u r\u00ebndua m\u00eb tej p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb vet\u00eb ekzistenc\u00ebs s\u00eb Bashkimit Europian, nj\u00eb organizat\u00eb duksh\u00ebm e palidhur nga\u00a0 NATO, por q\u00eb faktikisht paraqitet si korniz\u00eb shtetesh me aset euroatlantik q\u00eb p\u00ebrfshin pothuajse vet\u00eb shtetet an\u00ebtare t\u00eb Aleanc\u00ebs. Konfrontimi me Rusin\u00eb, i thelluar n\u00eb 2014 si pasoj\u00eb e Euromaidanit, ka niveluar n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb definitive kufijt\u00eb gjeopolitik\u00eb midis t\u00eb dy strukturave europiane. T\u00eb pakt\u00ebn p\u00ebr Mosk\u00ebn, ato jan\u00eb zhdukur krejt\u00ebsisht.<\/p>\n<p>Situata, gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb e komplikuar dhe nebuloze, komplikohet tani p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb dinamikave t\u00eb brendshme n\u00eb mazhoranc\u00ebn e shteteve europiane, Shtetet e Bashkuara, Rusin\u00eb, Ukrain\u00ebn dhe vendeve t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb periferis\u00eb lindore europiane. K\u00ebto dinamika jan\u00eb t\u00eb afta t\u00eb anullojn\u00eb kalkulimet strategjike t\u00eb kujt nga lart beson t\u00eb luaj\u00eb n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb aft\u00eb, edhe kur \u00ebsht\u00eb e bindur t\u00eb reagoj\u00eb aq m\u00eb shum\u00eb ndaj l\u00ebvizjeve t\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtarit. Ajo q\u00eb e b\u00ebn situat\u00ebn e rrezikshme \u00ebsht\u00eb mungesa e kuptimit reciprok lidhur me at\u00eb \u00e7ka po ndodh. 30 vite nga fillimi i k\u00ebsaj epoke t\u00eb re, n\u00eb Mosk\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb e qart\u00eb se t\u00eb vazhdohet t\u00eb bazohesh mbi jo th\u00ebnie dhe miklime b\u00ebhet m\u00eb pak efikas dhe provokon vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb p\u00ebrkeq\u00ebsim t\u00eb kriz\u00ebs. Kur Vladimir Putini n\u00eb diskutimin e tij n\u00eb Ministrin\u00eb e Jashtme n\u00eb n\u00ebndorin 2021 ka k\u00ebrkuar q\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrpunoj\u00eb bashk\u00eb me bashk\u00ebbiseduesit per\u00ebndimor\u00eb nj\u00eb sistem jet\u00ebgjat\u00eb n\u00eb koh\u00eb q\u00eb i garanton sigurin\u00eb Rusis\u00eb, nuk b\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb nxitje t\u00eb radh\u00ebs n\u00eb stilin e viteve \u20182000. Sot nevojitet t\u00eb flitet konkretisht p\u00ebr nj\u00eb anullim t\u00eb parimit t\u00eb aderimit t\u00eb lir\u00eb t\u00eb shteteve n\u00eb aleanc\u00ebn q\u00eb zgjedhin vet\u00eb. P\u00ebr gjeopolitik\u00ebn tradicionale t\u00eb bazuar mbi ekuilibrin e forcave, ky parim \u00ebsht\u00eb i privuar nga kuptimi, megjith\u00ebse n\u00eb dekadat e fundit e konsiderojn\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb nj\u00eb aksiom\u00eb. Kjo qasje ka ezauruar mund\u00ebsit\u00eb e saj. Megjithat\u00eb, duket se t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtosh nj\u00eb korniz\u00eb t\u00eb re n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet negociatave politiko \u2013 diplomatike \u00ebsht\u00eb e pamundur.<\/p>\n<p>Kemi arritur politikisht n\u00eb limit dhe tani polemika (tashm\u00eb e vjet\u00ebr) mbi zgjerimin e NATO n\u00eb nj\u00eb far\u00eb m\u00ebnyre duhet zgjidhur: ose t\u00eb konfirmohet paapelueshm\u00ebria e s\u00eb drejt\u00ebs s\u00eb Aleanc\u00ebs p\u00ebr t\u2019u zgjeruar (deri m\u00eb tani dhe n\u00eb t\u00eb ardhmen), ose n\u00eb t\u00eb kund\u00ebrt t\u00eb njihet se logjika p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilin shtetet kan\u00eb t\u00eb drejt\u00ebn q\u00eb t\u00eb aderojn\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb aleanc\u00eb (logjik\u00eb mbi t\u00eb cil\u00ebn bazohet ideja e zgjerimit t\u00eb NATO qysh nga 1991) nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e vlefshme. Ky opsion i fundit do t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktonte nj\u00eb kthes\u00eb radikale, por n\u00eb t\u00eb dyja rastet rreziqet jan\u00eb t\u00eb shumta. Projekte organesh t\u00eb mundshme kozmetike q\u00eb imitojn\u00eb nd\u00ebrveprimet midis Rusis\u00eb dhe NATO kan\u00eb d\u00ebshtuar prej koh\u00ebsh. Konfrontimi paraushtarak \u00ebsht\u00eb rinovuar dhe Pakti Atlantik duhet t\u2019i arrij\u00eb premtimet e tij. Megjithat\u00eb, n\u00eb radh\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb, p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrdorur nj\u00eb eufemiz\u00ebn, vendet an\u00ebtare jan\u00eb pak t\u00eb prirur p\u00ebr t\u00eb nd\u00ebrhyr\u00eb n\u00eb misione t\u00eb rrezikuara.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb radh\u00eb t\u00eb dyt\u00eb, mbrojtja e nj\u00eb serie vendesh t\u00eb hyra n\u00eb NATO n\u00eb vitet \u201990 \u2013 \u20182000 (si republikat balltike) \u00ebsht\u00eb komplekse nga nj\u00eb pik\u00ebpamje ushtarake. N\u00eb radh\u00eb t\u00eb tret\u00eb, shkalla e divergjenc\u00ebs e pik\u00ebpamjeve brenda vendeve t\u00eb Aleanc\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb e pakrahasueshme respektivisht nj\u00eb kohe. Problemi, m\u00eb pari shprehimisht teorik, i garancive t\u00eb mbrojtjes reciproke t\u00eb ofruara an\u00ebtar\u00ebve t\u00eb rinj mund t\u00eb b\u00ebhet sot konkrete, megjith\u00ebse \u00ebsht\u00eb e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb t\u00eb imagjinohen\u00eb realitet k\u00ebt\u00eb skenare t\u00eb tmerrsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb cil\u00ebt flasin m\u00eb t\u00eb \u00abrinjt\u00eb\u00bb n\u00eb Aleanc\u00eb (p\u00ebr shembull, ideja se Putini mund ta v\u00ebr\u00eb n\u00eb prov\u00eb NATO duke sulmuar vendet balltike apo Polonin\u00eb). Duket se n\u00eb Mosk\u00eb ka m\u00eb shum\u00eb respekt p\u00ebr Aleanc\u00ebn sesa jo p\u00ebr Rig\u00ebn dhe Talinin dhe se k\u00ebtu nuk ushqehen dyshime mbi faktin se ajo do t\u2019i mbaj\u00eb premtimet e saj. Por kur \u00e7\u00ebshtja u intereson vendeve q\u00eb nuk jan\u00eb pjes\u00eb e NATO, por q\u00eb sillen sikur p\u00ebr momente t\u00eb ishin, rreziku i p\u00ebrplasjes rritet. Problemi q\u00eb ka \u00e7uar n\u00eb luft\u00ebn ruso \u2013 gjeorgjiane t\u00eb 2008 mund t\u00eb riparaqiten.<\/p>\n<p>Mungesa e garancive formale nga ana e NATO, bashkuar me ventilimin e nj\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetjeje formale n\u00eb nivel politiko \u2013 ideologjik dhe pjes\u00ebrisht ushtarak ndaj k\u00ebtyre vendeve joan\u00ebtare, krijon nj\u00eb \u00abzon\u00eb t\u00eb hirt\u00eb\u00bb t\u00eb pap\u00ebrcaktuar. Kur Putini u k\u00ebrkon diplomat\u00ebve t\u00eb tij q\u00eb t\u00eb mbajn\u00eb gjall\u00eb nj\u00eb \u00abtension\u00bb t\u00eb caktuar kundrejt Per\u00ebndimit, u kujton atyre nj\u00eb gj\u00eb gjithmon\u00eb t\u00eb vlefshme: se \u00e7do munges\u00eb v\u00ebmendjeje ndaj k\u00ebtyre \u00abzonave t\u00eb hirta\u00bb mund t\u00eb ket\u00eb pasoja t\u00eb r\u00ebnda. \u00cbsht\u00eb nj\u00eb paralajm\u00ebrim q\u00eb sip\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsia strategjike, indiferenca ndaj \u00abvija e t\u00eb kuqe\u00bb t\u00eb deklaruara nga Moska mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrfundoj\u00eb keq. Sigurimi i situat\u00ebs n\u00eb Europ\u00ebn Lindore \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb sinjal i faktit q\u00eb parimi n\u00eb baz\u00ebn e hap\u00ebsir\u00ebs s\u00eb siguris\u00eb s\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktuar 30 vite m\u00eb par\u00eb nuk funksionon m\u00eb. Zgjerimi i NATO ka dizajnuar nj\u00eb peizazh gjeopolitiko \u2013 ushtarak nuk t\u00eb cilin jetojm\u00eb tani. Ruajtja e k\u00ebtij aseti mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrcktoj\u00eb eskalim ushtarak, nd\u00ebrsa refuzimi do t\u00eb k\u00ebrkoj\u00eb nj\u00eb rishikim rr\u00ebnj\u00ebsor t\u00eb sistemit t\u00eb \u00abvijave t\u00eb kuqe\u00bb. P\u00ebr shembull, mund t\u00eb konsiderohet se kthehet n\u00eb konceptin e \u00abfinlandizimit\u00bb t\u00eb epok\u00ebs s\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb, me p\u00ebrfundimin e s\u00eb cil\u00ebs ka filluar t\u00eb perceptohet n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb kritike; por \u00e7do gj\u00eb ndryshon n\u00eb koh\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb distanc\u00ebn e 30 viteve, \u00e7\u00ebshtja e struktur\u00ebs rajonale s\u00eb Europ\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb ende e hapur. N\u00eb vet\u00ebvete Europa \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb nj\u00eb periferi strategjike: nuk posedon nj\u00eb vullnet politik unik dhe \u00ebsht\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb e rudhur n\u00eb vet\u00ebvete. Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb historikisht dhe kulturalisht e lidhur me Europ\u00ebn dhe nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e mundur t\u00eb prishet kjo lidhje. Nj\u00ebkoh\u00ebsisht roli i Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb skenarin nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar varet n\u00eb pjes\u00eb minimale nga marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet e saj me Europ\u00ebn, p\u00ebrderisa ngjarjet themelore n\u00eb nivel global do t\u00eb mbahen n\u00eb jug dhe n\u00eb lindje t\u00eb kufijve rus\u00eb. Ka nj\u00eb paradoks n\u00eb faktin q\u00eb nd\u00ebrsa Rusia do ta mbyll\u00eb kapitullin e lidhur me rezultatet e Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb dhe me kolapsi e Bashkimit Sovjetik, kjo tem\u00eb do t\u00eb vazhdoj\u00eb t\u2019ia heq\u00eb v\u00ebmendjen nga \u00e7\u00ebshtje t\u00eb tjera m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme. P\u00ebr t\u00eb arritur marr\u00ebveshjet e reja mbi sigurin\u00eb europiane, Rusia do t\u00eb duhet t\u2019i p\u00ebrdor\u00eb aft\u00ebsit\u00eb e saj jo n\u00eb Europ\u00eb, por n\u00eb nivel bot\u00ebror. N\u00ebse nuk do ta b\u00ebj\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb e pamundur t\u00eb imagjinohet se bashk\u00ebbiseduesit \u00a0per\u00ebndimor\u00eb do t\u00eb rishikojn\u00eb \u00abshenjt\u00ebrin\u00eb\u00bb e rregullave t\u00eb dyvje\u00e7arit 1990 \u2013 1991. Me t\u00eb arritur objektivat e vendosur n\u00eb kap\u00ebrcyellin e mij\u00ebvje\u00e7ar\u00ebve, Rusia nuk e ka zgjidhur \u00e7\u00ebshtjen e statusit t\u00eb saj n\u00eb rendin e ardhsh\u00ebm global dhe do t\u00eb duhet ta b\u00ebj\u00eb n\u00eb vitet e ardhshme. \u00cbsht\u00eb ky rezultati i \u00e7uditsh\u00ebm i 30 viteve t\u00eb kaluara nga shembja e Bashkimit Sovjetik.<\/p>\n<p>(<em>Fedor Lukjanov \u00ebsht\u00eb Drejtor i Russia in Global Affairs. Profesor, hulumtues shkencor pran\u00eb NRU Higher School of Economics t\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs. President i K\u00ebshillit p\u00ebr Politik\u00ebn e Jashtme dhe t\u00eb Mbrojtjes<\/em>)<\/p>\n<p><strong>P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>E kishte gabim Obama kur e deklasonte Rusin\u00eb n\u00eb fuqi rajonale. Ama kishte t\u00eb drejt\u00eb. Kur Eurazia do t\u00eb z\u00ebvend\u00ebsoj\u00eb Europ\u00ebn, Moska do t\u00eb jet\u00eb gati? P\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsia p\u00ebr konfliktin n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb krejt\u00ebsisht i NATO. Ka ardhur koha t\u00eb ndalet ekspansioni i saj. N\u00eb marsin e 2014, nj\u00eb jav\u00eb pasi Krimeja u shpall zyrtarisht pjes\u00eb &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":6025,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[38],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6024","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-bota"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6024","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6024"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6024\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6025"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6024"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6024"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6024"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}